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Abstract
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has contributed to the emergence of
participatory sensing (PS) and collaborative learning (CL), where multiple participants col-
lect and report their data to a cloud service to analyse the union of the collected data
in the server-based framework. While in the decentralized framework, multiple partici-
pants collaboratively train a more accurate global model or multiple local models. How-
ever, the possibility of the cloud service or any participant being semi-honest or malicious
pose a serious challenge of preserving the participants’ privacy. Privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning and data aggregation aim to discover or derive useful statistics without
compromising privacy.
This thesis systematically investigates state-of-the-art techniques for privacy-preserving
machine learning and data aggregation in a range of IoT applications. Extensive theoret-
ical and experimental results are provided to support the following primary contribu-
tions.
First, we explore three privacy-preserving machine learning applications. Examples
include collaborative anomaly detection, human activity recognition and decentralized
collaboration in a biomedical domain. We tackle security challenges in collaborative
anomaly detection with a two-stage scheme called RG+RT: in the first stage, participants
individually perturb their data by passing through a nonlinear function called repeated
Gompertz (RG); in the second stage, the perturbed data are projected to a lower dimension
using a participant-specific uniform random transformation (RT) matrix. The nonlinear
RG function is designed to mitigate maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation attacks, while
random transformation resists independent component analysis (ICA) attacks. For human
activity recognition, a similar two-stage scheme called RG+RP is proposed, the difference
iii
lies in the second stage, where participants project their perturbed data to a lower dimen-
sion in an (almost) distance-preserving manner, using a random projection (RP) matrix.
The random projection can both resist ICA attacks and maintain model accuracy. These
proposed two-stage randomisation schemes are assessed in terms of their recovery resis-
tance to MAP estimation attacks. Preliminary theoretical analysis as well as experimen-
tal results on synthetic and real-world datasets indicate that both RG+RT and RG+RP
exhibit better recovery resistance to MAP estimation attacks than most state-of-the-art
techniques, meanwhile high utility is guaranteed. To mitigate the inherent limitations in
the centralized framework, and investigate the applicability of the decentralized frame-
work, we study the decentralized collaboration in a biomedical domain. In particular, we
develop an efficient Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Centroid Classifier (DPPCC) consider-
ing three practical scenarios, where distributed differential privacy (DDP) is combined with
distributed exponential ElGamal cryptosystem to preserve privacy and maintain utility.
We realize DDP using discrete Gaussian mechanism without any restriction on ε as in the
traditional Gaussian mechanism, and only the encrypted noisy model parameters or test
results are shared among all parties. It ensures each party learns nothing but the noisy
sum of local statistics.
Second, we examine privacy-preserving data aggregation in smart grid application.
To this end, we propose a multi-level aggregation framework based on fog architecture,
which combines DDP with homomorphic encryption to perturb and encrypt smart me-
ter data before forwarding to the nearby fog node. A two-layer encryption scheme is
proposed to ensure aggregator obliviousness and system robustness.
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The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, mobile computing, and social
network services provide the ability to capture data, either through compact, cheap, in-
telligent end nodes (sensors) or active contribution by people. An emerging data crowd-
sourcing paradigm is called participatory sensing(PS) [1] or mobile crowdsensing (MCS),
where data are captured, either through sensors or active contribution by individuals
with evermore capable mobile phones, and then sent to cloud services to analyze their
collected data [2]. Meanwhile, in the real world, many applications would benefit from
collaborative analysis across sensitive datasets maintained by different parties.
In these scenarios, participants want to extract information, improve local model, or
learn knowledge from their joint records through machine learning or data aggregation
techniques, without disclosing their privacy-sensitive information. Historically, Agrawal
1
2 Introduction
and Srikant [3] were the first to study this problem, under the umbrella term “privacy-
preserving data mining” (PPDM). PS/MCS promises novel applications in healthcare,
fitness, citizen science, emergency preparedness, etc. For example,
In healthcare, thanks to the proliferation of wearable devices for measuring heart rate,
blood pressure, movement, and many other physiological parameters, patients and elder-
lies can now be monitored through wearable devices, so that time-sensitive care can be
given. Just as importantly, the wearable sensor data can be mined to reveal insights about
the activities of the user community through collaborative multi-user activity recognition [4].
In fitness, integrated social networking drives data sharing, where there exists a large
community whose members upload their wearable sensor data to online services that
compile and publish community statistics. The ability to track and share fitness data
online can enable positive reinforcement by peer groups, which encourages people to
remain engaged in their physical activities and set new goals [5].
This trend is motivated by the need to collaborate with each other for more accurate
analysis, and the fact that the data owned by a single party may be very homogeneous,
resulting in an overfitted model that might deliver inaccurate results when applied to the
unseen data, i.e., poor generalizability. On the other hand, there is much demand to per-
form machine learning in a collaborative manner, since large amounts of data are often
required to ensure sufficient computational power to test hypotheses as insufficient local
training data may end up with worse models. In addition, decomposing and paralleliz-
ing computation among different parties could help reduce the demand for resources on
any single party.
In terms of data aggregation, the energy, memory and computation constraints in
distributed IoT end nodes pose various limitations that can make the network more vul-
nerable to malicious attacks and faults. The appearance of fog computing enables end
nodes to send their data to the nearest fog node for secure multi-level aggregation, thus
reducing time delay and resource bottlenecks.
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1.2 Problem Statement
As participants’ data commonly contain sensitive information, the increasing privacy and
confidentiality concerns pose barriers to more widespread use of these private data in a
broad of settings. The problem we are interested in can be stated as follows.
In centralized and distributed/federated machine learning frameworks, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1 (a) and Figure 2.1 (b), the central server is expected to compute useful statis-
tics or combine model information from multiple participants’ data. While the central
server is generally not malicious, it may be semi-honest or honest-but-curious, i.e., it follows
the protocol honestly, but may attempt to learn or infer sensitive information from users’
data. In some domains, especially biomedical related applications, users’ data is subject
to great privacy risks. Moreover, users are also concerned that their data might be sold to
third parties without their consent. For example, the fitness data collected by wearable
devices, might include heart rate, location, calorie consumption, stress level, and other
data that might reveal the user’s identity, ethnicity, disease risks, and other sensitive in-
formation [6], hence users are reluctant to share their personal data, even learned model
parameters or model updates.
Similarly, in decentralized machine learning, as depicted in Figure 2.1 (c), one of the
participants might be malicious, who aims to sabotage the collaborative learning process
or violate some of the privacy requirements by inferring information about the victim
party’s private data, which the attacker is not supposed to know. Consequently, data
sharing and collaboration had been significantly hindered due to these privacy and con-
fidentiality restrictions.
Another important privacy leakage examined by this thesis is in data aggregation.
In particular, we study the privacy issues in smart grid, where the adversaries might
eavesdrop on communications, compromise smart meters, or hack into the cloud or fog
servers. The fine-grained energy consumption data can potentially be used to infer, pro-
file and monitor household activity from the extracted information, for instance, the ab-
sence or presence of occupants, appliance usage, daily activities, even lifestyle of different
households, and other such private information. In addition, the aggregator may have
arbitrary auxiliary information a priori. These threats to security and privacy have been
broadly studied [6–10]. Meanwhile, these privacy concerns could be largely reduced if
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only their aggregation is released, while still providing the benefits of data cooperation
for operational purposes. For example, individual privacy leakage can be reduced by
releasing the aggregate of household usage information. However, there is no guarantee
that the resulting aggregate ensures privacy as it still contains private information. This
holds even more for a daily profile of the aggregate values [11].
This thesis aims to address the above privacy issues in machine learning and data
aggregation, by investigating a range of relevant applications in Section 1.3. In particu-
lar, this thesis assumes honest-but-curious threat models for privacy-preserving machine
learning applications in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 6, while privacy-preserving
data aggregation in Chapter 5 considers 2/3 parties to be honest-but-curious.
1.3 Research Applications
For privacy-preserving machine learning, we explore three practical applications. In par-
ticular, for centralized privacy-preserving machine learning, we study Privacy-Preserving
Collaborative Anomaly Detection, and Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Human Activity Recog-
nition. For decentralized privacy-preserving machine learning, we investigate a practical
application in the biomedical domain, i.e., Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Machine Learn-
ing in Biomedical Domain. For privacy-preserving data aggregation, we propose Privacy-
Preserving Fog-enabled Aggregation in Smart Grid.
• Chapter 3: Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Anomaly Detection: The process of
detecting interesting or unusual events in the network is known as anomaly detec-
tion [12]. Anomaly detection is important for tasks such as security, fault diagnosis,
intrusion detection, and monitoring applications. Given the possibility that the
cloud service is honest but curious, a major challenge is how to protect participants’
privacy.
• Chapter 4: Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Human Activity Recognition: We
consider the scenario where a cloud service provider performs deep learning on
the collected data contributed by a large number of participants. To remove the
deterrents for users to share their data and benefit from the community knowledge
discovery afforded by participatory sensing (PS) or mobile crowdsensing (MCS), service
1.3 Research Applications 5
providers need privacy-preserving algorithms that deliver a reasonable trade-off
between data privacy and utility. Hence the problem we are addressing is how a
data owner can release its data with the guarantees that the original sensitive information
cannot be recovered while the analytic utility of the data are preserved.
• Chapter 5: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning in Biomedical
Domain: A wealth of practical applications fall under horizontally partitioned
database category, where multiple parties each manage different groups of individ-
uals with similar features. For example, in biomedical domains, various types of
data (i.e., demographic, clinical, and genomic) are increasingly being digitized, col-
lected and stored in independent hospitals or biomedical research institutions [13].
However, local repositories or institutions are reluctant to share their data with the
susceptible centralized third party due to privacy concerns and in some jurisdic-
tions, legislation. This prevents researchers and consequently patients from bene-
fiting from distributed data using machine learning techniques. Therefore, we are
motivated to develop a decentralized interactive solution by removing the trusted
server under the assumption that strictly less than one third of the parties are ma-
licious. On the other hand, because a learning model trained on some dataset can
be considered as a high level statistic for that dataset, and even the predication
of a trained model can reveal privacy about training data through black-box at-
tack [14–16]. Therefore, we consider how to facilitate decentralized collaboration by
sharing locally learned model parameters or model outputs in a privacy-preserving
manner. In particular, we apply the efficient Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Cen-
troid Classifier (DPPCC) to three practical cases, where only the encrypted noisy
model parameters or model predictions are shared among all parties. DPPCC pro-
vides an efficient, and privacy-preserving solution for collaboration among multi-
ple hospitals or biomedical research institutions.
• Chapter 6: Privacy-Preserving Fog-enabled Aggregation in Smart Grid: Smart
grids have emerged and been recognised as the next generation of power grid [17],
and is expected to provide improved reliability, flexibility, sustainability, consumer
involvement, and security. As an essential feature of smart grids, smart metering
allows residential customers to monitor, track and reduce electricity costs through
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smart meters (SMs). State-of-the-art information and communication technologies
facilitate communication between grid participants and the service provider (aka
smart grid operation center in this context), which aims to compute useful statistics
to serve for various social and economic purposes, as well as deliver better services,
e.g., load modeling/forecasting/management, monitoring real-time consumption,
network planning and settlement, energy generation and price optimization as per
demand. Furthermore, users will be rewarded by changing their consumption
habits to better match generation [7]. With the prevalence of smart appliances, it
is expected that the smart grid can even remotely schedule the selected appliances
to flatten demand [8]. As an important aspect in smart grids, the sum/aggregation
of energy consumption data at multiple levels (neighborhood, subdivision, district,
city, etc.) is essential for load modeling/forecasting/management, monitoring real-
time consumption, predicting power consumption, network planning and settle-
ment, energy generation and price optimization as per demand, etc. [9, 10, 18–21].
Hence, the key problem in the multi-level aggregation of smart metering is how to
minimize the privacy leakage of the locally released statistics while ensuring high utility.
The chapters of this thesis explore different settings of centralization and different
applications. In many of these cases different privacy/utility trade-offs can be struck,
and so we have applied a range of privacy frameworks and techniques as case studies.
For all the four applications in this thesis, Table 1.1 summarizes the key differences from
the perspective of frameworks, threat models, privacy mechanisms and privacy metrics.
We want to remark that although the first stage in the two-stage schemes of Chapter 3
and Chapter 3 both share the same nonlinear RG function, the second stage is different
to tailor to different applications. Similarly, it should be noted that although Chapter 5
and Chapter 6 both adopt DDP and homomorphic encryption, there are at least two ob-
vious differences: (1) Chapter 5 puts forward a discrete Gaussian mechanism to achieve
(ε, δ)-differential privacy without restriction on ε, via stability of the discrete Gaussian
distribution implemented through rejection sampling. In contrast, Chapter 6 directly
follows the traditional (ε, δ)-differential privacy [22], where ε < 1; (2) The encryption
scheme and realization are totally different. Chapter 5 develops a distributed exponen-
tial ElGamal cryptosystem to support fault tolerance, availability of our protocol, etc. In
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Table 1.1: Differences between the four applications in this thesis.
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contrast, Chapter 6 proposes a two-layer encryption scheme: the first layer applies OTP
to ensure aggregator obliviousness, while the second layer uses public-key cryptography
for authenticity. These differences are highlighted in Table 1.1.
1.4 Contributions of this Thesis
This thesis systematically studies privacy-preserving machine learning and privacy-
preserving data aggregation, and explores four practical applications in IoT, including
collaborative anomaly detection, human activity recognition, decentralized collaboration
in biomedical domain and smart metering. It delivers the following contributions in four
main chapters.
• Chapter 3 tackles the security challenges in collaborative anomaly detection via a
cloud server. Our contributions here are two-fold: (i) the proposal of a two-stage
scheme called RG+RT: in the first stage, participants perturb their data by passing
through a nonlinear function called repeated Gompertz (RG); in the second stage, the
perturbed data are projected to a lower dimension using a participant-specific uni-
form random transformation (RT) matrix. The nonlinear RG function is designed to
mitigate maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation attacks, while random transforma-
tion aims to resist independent component analysis (ICA) attacks, and (ii) the evalua-
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tion of the privacy-preserving properties of the existing schemes and the RG+RT.
In terms of the recovery rate, which measures how well an attacker can recover the
original data from the perturbed data, RG+RT proposed here is found to be more
resistant to MAP estimation attacks than the state-of-the-art schemes.
• Chapter 4 addresses privacy issues in human activity recognition. Our contribu-
tions here are as follows: (i) the proposal of a two-stage perturbation mechanism
called RG+RP for privacy-preserving collaborative deep learning, which maintains
the privacy of both normal and anomalous records in terms of resistance to both
MAP estimation attacks and ICA attacks. The random projection stage ensures the
accuracy of time-series classification, especially for large data size. In addition, RP
also contributes to energy saving transmission by compressing data; (ii) a novel
LSTM-CNN model is applied to human activity recognition from wearable sen-
sor data. LSTM-CNN model demonstrates better performance than the traditional
DBN model and standalone LSTM, CNN models, and preserves learning accuracy
even after the two-stage perturbation. Preliminary theoretical analysis as well as
experimental results on synthetic and real-world datasets indicate that RG+RP ex-
hibit better recovery resistance to MAP estimation attacks than most state-of-the-art
techniques. Our solution shows great promise for building MCS applications that
respect the participants’ privacy.
• Chapter 5 examines the limitations in the server-based framework, and investigates
the possibility of a decentralized framework to facilitate decentralized collaboration
among different institutions in the biomedical domain. For this chapter, we make
the following main contributions:
(i) We address centroid classifier learning without central aggregation, under a
strong threat model of Byzantine fault tolerance;
(ii) We provide theoretical analysis and investigate three practical sharing cases
where all parties collaborate, without disclosure of their data, to:
1. learn a shared model;
2. produce a prediction for a given sample and;
3. produce a prediction without revealing the sample or prediction.
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(iii) We put forward a discrete Gaussian mechanism to achieve (ε, δ)-differential
privacy without restriction on ε, via stability of the discrete Gaussian distribution
implemented through rejection sampling; and
(iv) We conduct a comprehensive experimental study on biomedical datasets, con-
firming the practicality of our framework.
• Chapter 6 deals with privacy concerns in smart metering. Our contributions here
include: (i) we propose an efficient and privacy-preserving aggregation model with
fog/cloud hybrid architecture. It povides multi-level aggregation, and achieves ag-
gregator obliviousness. In particular, the intermediate fog nodes can periodically
collect data from the connected smart meters and derive fine-grained fog level
aggregation for further cloud level aggregation, thus conserving communication
energy. (ii) we combine DDP with additive homomorphic encryption to derive
differentially-private aggregation; (iii) to mitigate privacy loss and maintain util-
ity, a two-layer encryption scheme is proposed: the first layer applies one-time pad
(OTP) to encrypt individual noisy measurement in an additive homomorphic man-
ner to achieve aggregator obliviousness, while the second layer provides authenti-
cation by using public-key cryptography; (iv) our privacy model is stronger in the
sense that we do not trust the aggregator. We ensure that the aggregator is only
able to learn the desired statistics without knowing additional information. Fur-
thermore, our model supports authenticity, malfunction/non-responding nodes,
and node joins and departures; (v) we give theoretical analysis, and conduct a com-
prehensive study on real-world smart metering data, confirming the superiority of
our proposed schemes.
1.5 Thesis Organization




























Figure 1.1: Thesis organization.
• Chapter 1: This chapter presents the background of this research, the problem state-
ment, research applications, thesis contributions, and the organization of this thesis.
• Chapter 2: This chapter offers a complete overview of various frameworks, adver-
sary models, privacy attacks and techniques that have been developed for privacy-
preserving machine learning. This chapter first presents different machine learning
frameworks, followed by the review of the relevant privacy issues and existing so-
lutions. Fog-empowered data aggregation is introduced to address the security is-
sues in smart grid. Next, it reviews popular adversary models and privacy attacks,
followed by the privacy-preserving techniques that consist of encryption, data ran-
domisation, and differential privacy.
Part I: This part explores centralized and decentralized privacy-preserving machine
learning applications in seperate chapters, including Privacy-Preserving Collaborative
Anomaly Detection, Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Human Activity Recognition, and
Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning in Biomedical Domain.
• Chapter 3: This chapter focuses on privacy-preserving collaborative anomaly de-
tection, a two-stage scheme called RG+RT is proposed: in the first stage, a non-
linear function called repeated Gompertz (RG) is used to perturb each participant’s
1.5 Thesis Organization 11
data, and mitigate maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation attacks; in the second
stage, each participant uses a specific uniform random transformation (RT) matrix
to resist independent component analysis (ICA) attacks. The proposed two-stage ran-
domisation scheme is assessed in terms of its recovery resistance to MAP estimation
attacks.
• Chapter 4: This chapter discusses how to perform accurate collaborative human
activity recognition without compromising privacy, and studies the basic distance-
preserving properties of multiplicative perturbation techniques. RG+RP is applied
to mitigate maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation attacks, resist independent compo-
nent analysis (ICA) attacks and ensure model accuracy. A novel LSTM-CNN model
is developed for human activity recognition.
• Chapter 5: This chapter progresses the decentralized collaboration in biomedical
domain. An efficient Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Centroid Classifier (DPPCC) is
developed and three practical scenarios are considered, where distributed differ-
ential privacy is combined with distributed exponential ElGamal cryptosystem to
preserve privacy and maintain utility. A discrete Gaussian mechanism is put for-
ward to achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy without restriction on ε, via stability of
the discrete Gaussian distribution implemented through rejection sampling
Part II: This part studies the problem of privacy-preserving data aggregation in
smart grid application, i.e., how to derive accurate multi-level data aggregation,
reduce transmission energy, and preserve user privacy.
• Chapter 6: This chapter addresses the security issues in smart grid, and focuses on
how to aggregate smart meter data in a privacy-preserving manner. We combine
DDP with efficient homomorphic encryption to perturb and encrypt smart meter
data, and provide multi-level aggregation using fog/cloud hybrid framework. A
two-layer encryption scheme is presented to ensure aggregator obliviousness and
system robustness, including authenticity, node failure, node joins and departures.
• Chapter 7: This chapter concludes this thesis and outlines the directions for future
research.
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Literature Review and Related Work
2.1 Database Partitioning
The most common type of data storage is relational databases [23], which consists of
multiple records/tuples, and each record/tuple contains multiple features/attributes. In
distributed collaborative learning, relational datasets belonging to different data owners
can be categorised into the following three categories:
• Horizontally partitioned database: different parties hold different records contain-
ing the same attributes [24, 25];
• Vertically partitioned database: different parties hold different attributes of the
same records [26–28];
• Arbitrarily partitioned database: for each record, attributes are arbitrarily dis-
tributed across multiple parties [29, 30].
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In the following chapters, we mainly focus on horizontally partitioned database, where
training data comprising m training examples are split over a matrix X ∈ Rm×d on d
features and associated labels Y ∈ Rm. The whole database is partitioned into n disjoint
subsets (Xi, Yi) for i ∈ {1, n} representing n parties each curating their own part of the
data over a common d-dimensional feature space.
2.2 Machine Learning Frameworks
In general, the frameworks for machine learning mainly fall into the following three
categories: centralized framework, distributed/federated framework and decentralized
framework.
• Centralized framework. As illustrated in Figure 2.1 (a), parties do not need to
learn any models in the centralized framework. Instead, parties send their data to
a centralized server, who is entitled to see all parties’ data in the clear, and learn a
global model to provide beneficial services (e.g., prediction API, video editing tools
or health apps, etc).
• Distributed/Federated framework. As illustrated in Figure 2.1 (b), parties partic-
ipate in the learning process, while the server is entitled to mediate the modeling
process by aggregating local models in the distributed/federated framework.
• Decentralized framework. However, due to privacy sensitivity, a party may not
trust a single central server [31], and so may not be willing to transfer its data
or model parameters to the server. Moreover, the central servers in both central-
ized framework and distributed/federated framework are susceptible to single-
point-of-failure, single-point-of-breach, etc, hence a decentralized implementation
is highly desired, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (c).
Below, we review the relevant privacy issues and existing solutions for different ma-
chine learning frameworks.
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(a) Centralized. (b) Distributed/Federated. (c) Decentralized. (d) Fog-embedded.
Figure 2.1: Different machine learning frameworks.
2.2.1 Centralized Machine Learning
Most of the centralized machine learning frameworks force multiple participants to pool
their data into a trusted centralized server to train a global model on the combined data,
as depicted in Figure 2.1 (a). This centralized framework is very effective, but it’s not
privacy-preserving since the server has direct access to all sensitive data. Moreover, a
trusted server rarely exists in real world, as the excessive data collected from users could
be used for unintended purposes (e.g., face recognition for targeted social advertising),
posing immediate or potential privacy risks. As pointed out by Shokri et al. [32], central-
ized learning poses serious privacy threats: (i) all the sensitive training data are revealed
to a susceptible third party who can keep the collected data forever; (ii) data owners have
no control over the learning objective or knowledge of what can be inferred from their
data; (iii) the learned model is not directly available to data owners. To mitigate these
privacy risks, Microsoft developed CryptoNets [33,34] to perform learning on encrypted
data and provide encrypted outputs to users [33]. However, CryptoNets assumes the
weights of the neural network have been trained beforehand, and aims at making pre-
diction for test records. Another alternative is to perturb data before forwarding to the
server, while maintaining the analytic properties [35–38]. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 study
two practical centralized machine learning applications, and address two representative
privacy attacks via data randomization.
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2.2.2 Distributed/Federated Machine Learning
In contrast, in distributed/federated learning, participants are involved in the training
process, and the server is entitled to distribute key shares, mediate the modeling pro-
cess or aggregate local models, as illustrated in [8–10, 32]. Wainwright et al. [39] intro-
duce the concept of distributed deep learning to protect privacy of local training data,
as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (b). Instead of explicitly sharing training data, parties collab-
oratively train a global model by sharing only a fraction of the gradients of their indi-
vidually trained local models with each other through the mediate of parameter server.
Distributed learning is further explored in [32, 40–42]. Mohassel et al. [43] provide a so-
lution for training neural networks while preserving privacy of participants. However,
they deploy secure multiparty computation (SMC) in the two-server model where clients
outsource their computation to these two servers who are assumed not colluding with
each other. In general, SMC techniques achieve a high level of privacy and accuracy,
at the expense of high computational and communication overhead for the participants,
thereby doing a disservice to attracting participation.
Alternatively, Shokri et al. [32] are the first to introduce the concept of Distributed Se-
lective Stochastic Gradient Descent (DSSGD) as an alternative to the costly SMC techniques.
It allows each party to keep local model private while iteratively update its model by
integrating differentially-private gradients of other parties through a parameter server.
Communication cost is addressed by only sharing a fraction (e.g., 1%-10%) of local model
gradients that are above a threshold or the gradients with the largest absolute values
through a parameter server during each round of communication. To achieve this goal,
they exploit the fact that optimization algorithms, such as SGD, can be parallelized and
executed asynchronously. Each party computes local model gradients based on local
training data, then a fraction of gradients are forwarded to parameter server, who is
honest-but-curious: it is assumed to be curious in extracting the data of individuals; and
yet, it is assumed to be honest in operations. Their approach includes a selective param-
eter sharing process combined with updating local model parameters during SGD. Each
participant uploads and downloads a percentage of the most recent updates to avoid get-
ting stuck into local minima. In addition, the shared local model gradients are blurred
by adding noise using differential privacy. However, besides all the weaknesses in the
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server-based model as mentioned in Section 1.2, their model poses the following risks:
• Meaningless privacy: Their privacy bounds are given per-parameter, the large
number of parameters prevents the technique from providing a meaningful privacy
guarantee. For example, Shokri reports ∼ 92% accuracy on SVHN with privacy
budget ε > 2 per epoch of 300,000 model parameters, naively, this corresponds
to a total ε > 600, 000 for θu = 1, and ε > 60, 000 for θu = 0.1, which is actually
meaningless for differential privacy as the total privacy loss per participant exceeds
several thousand [44].
• Privacy leakage: Because DSSGD offers meaningless privacy, as demonstrated
by [45], local data information may be leaked to an honest-but-curious parameter
server, even a small portion of original gradients may reveal information of local
data, and thus the server can extract individual data with non-negligible proba-
bility in the case of only one neuron, and even for general neural networks with
regularization, the gradients can still reveal the label of the original data.
• Vulnerability to GAN attack: Another assumption in the server-based framework
is that all the parties are honest, neglecting the possibility of malicious parties. In re-
ality, if a party turns out to be malicious, it can easily sabotage the learning process
(e.g., by spoofing random data samples) or violate some of the privacy requirements
by inferring information about the victim party’s private data, which the attacker
is not supposed to know. Hitaj et al. [46] devise an active inference attack on deep
neural networks in a collaborative setting, which is referred to as Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GAN) attack. It exploits the real-time nature of the learning process
that allows the adversarial party to train a GAN that generates prototypical sam-
ples of the targeted training data that was meant to be private and the generated
samples are intended to come from the same distribution as the training data. Fig-
ure 4 in [46] illustrates how a malicious party can intentionally compromise any
other party via server, the malicious party is able to operate successfully as long
as the global model is under the process of learning. GAN attack makes the dis-
tributed setting even more undesirable, as in centralized learning only the server
can violate users’ privacy, but in distributed learning, any user may violate the pri-
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vacy of other users in the system, even without involving the server [46]. It is worth
noting that GAN attack succeeds only if the following three conditions are held: (i)
adversary has knowledge of labels of other participants; (ii) class distribution of
the adversary and honest parties are non-IID; (iii) each party does not adopt any
privacy protection mechanism or offers meaningless privacy.
DSSGD was later extended to federated learning to deal with non-IID and unbalanced
data, including FedAvg and FedSGD developed by researchers from Google [41,47]. The
goal is to train a shared model while leaving training data on users’ mobile phones. In-
stead, mobile phones with relatively powerful and fast processors (including GPUs) are
required to download the current model, compute an update by performing local compu-
tation, then send local model update to the trusted Google Cloud server in each epoch of
training process. To protect individual model updates from the adversarial server who
might scrutinize individual updates in federated learning, instead of using differential
privacy as in [32], Bonawitz et al. [47] propose a secure aggregation protocol to protect
privacy of model updates of each user. The updates from individual users are securely
aggregated by SMC as the weighted average of model gradients. Another more efficient
method is to borrow differential privacy to guarantee user-level privacy, as demonstrated
by McMahan et al. [42]. However, the default trusted Google server is entitled to see all
users’ update in the clear, aggregate these updates and add noise to the aggregation, re-
sulting in privacy leakage, hence their scheme is even weaker than DSSGD when the
server is untrusted.
2.2.3 Decentralized Machine Learning
It has been pointed out that the central server-based learning frameworks, including cen-
tralized and distributed/federated machine learning frameworks, suffer from the follow-
ing weaknesses:
• Untrusted server. Due to privacy sensitivity, a party may not trust a single central
server [31], and so may not be willing to transfer its data or model parameters to
the server.
• Single-point-of-failure. If the central server is shut down for maintenance, the
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whole network stops working [48]. Moreover, if the central server is attacked, the
entire network is under the risk of being compromised [31].
To address and overcome these weaknesses, a practical solution is to remove the central
server and parallelize computation among multiple parties to help reduce the demand
for resources on any single party, as shown in Figure 2.1 (c). The decentralized frame-
work is much stronger than server-based frameworks, in the sense that it is a purely
decentralized framework without relying on any central server. The first decentralized
machine learning model is ModelChain [49], which applies Blockchain technology to ma-
chine learning by incorporating the idea of boosting, i.e., samples that are more difficult
to classify are more likely to improve the model significantly. More specifically, the global
model is initialized with the local model with the lowest error to prevent error propaga-
tion, and in the follow-up epochs, the party with the highest error is chosen to be the
winner party to update the model as it contains the most information to further improve
the model, and thus should be assigned a higher priority to be chosen as the party to
update the model. The updating process is repeated until the consensus global model is
derived, i.e., when a party wins the update bid in two consecutive epochs. However, their
proposed logic for ModelChain is reasonable only if all the participants are completely
honest. Furthermore, privacy issues are not considered. In their ModelChain, each party
publicly reveals its plain model rather than publishing less sensitive model parameters,
thus each party can get access to the intermediate and consensus global model. Another
more reasonable choice is to apply differential privacy in the decentralized framework,
which gives rise to the concept of distributed differential privacy (DDP) to reflect the fact
that the noise in the target statistic is sourced from all participants. Dwork et al. [50]
first described a distributed protocol to achieve differential privacy in the decentralized
framework: the shares of random binomial noise are generated by performing coin flip-
ping, which is secure against malicious participants, however, it requires communication
among users and the expensive secret sharing technique results in O(n) multiplications
and additions in shares, where n denotes the number of participants, thus not prefer-
able for large number of participants. In Chapter 5, we address the privacy issues in the
decentralized machine learning for three practical scenarios in biomedical domain.
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2.3 Fog-Empowered Data Aggregation
With the growing quantity of data generated at the edge of the IoT network, the speed of
data transmission is becoming a bottleneck in the cloud computing paradigm. For exam-
ple, some IoT applications require fast timely responses, some involve private data, and
some produce large amounts of data, which might cause serious communication burden
on the network. The difficulties in scaling to ever increasing numbers of sensors and actu-
ators, unpredictable response time from cloud server to end nodes and unreliable cloud
connections can bring down the services offered by cloud, especially for large-scale ap-
plications, such as smart grids. Additionally, the excessive data collected from end nodes
could be used for unintended purposes, posing immediate or potential privacy risks.
Therefore, it can be beneficial to forward data to the nearby one-hop away fog nodes. In
this regard, fog architecture serves as a potential technique to provide off-loading for the
cloud, and reduce the time delay and energy cost within an IoT network [51].
The fog paradigm is well positioned for real-time large-scale data analysis by support-
ing densely distributed data sources, and providing superior user experience [52, 53]. It
extends cloud computing services to the edge of the network by providing users with
computation, storage, and application services. Fog nodes can be distinguished from
cloud servers by their proximity to end-users, dense geographical distribution and sup-
port for mobility [54]. In addition, fog architectures are potentially more privacy friendly
than cloud architectures. Henceforth, fog computing becomes an efficient alternative to
cloud computing in many IoT applications. In general, while the cloud has the largest
storage capacity and the highest processing capability, fog nodes have intermediate stor-
age and processing capabilities, and end nodes, which are often battery powered, have
limited memory, processing and energy resources. Consider a Libelium Waspmote (sen-
sor node) with a 14.7456MHz ATmega1281 processor, 8KB SRAM, 4KB EEPROM, and
128KB flash memory. It can communicate at 2.4GHz frequency (250Kb/s) using an XBee
module [55], and store at most 100 two-dimensional floating-point number.
As estimated by Cisco Global Cloud Index, by 2019, data produced by people, ma-
chines, and the IoT will reach 500 zettabytes, however, the global data center IP traffic
will only reach 10.4 zettabytes by that time [56]. Further, 45% of IoT-created data will
be stored, processed, analyzed, and acted upon close to, or at the edge of the network
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[57]. Fog nodes can be effectively utilized to perform data processing, fine-grained ag-
gregation or timely anomaly detection. Furthermore, processing on the nearby fog nodes
facilitates early detection at the source, and prolongs the lifetime of the energy-limited
network. Consequently, we provide a promising solution based on fog computing archi-
tecture, which could be used for large-scale IoT applications.
We envision a Fog-empowered multi-level framework (three-level for illustration
purpose) in Figure 2.2, there exist numerous end nodes at the bottom layer, fog nodes
at the middle layer and cloud at the top layer. The fog nodes at the middle layer can act
as both fog server with more powerful storage and processing capability, and fog edge
nodes, who can interact with heterogenous devices, such as different types of end devices
with various protocols. Therefore, a fog node can process/aggregate measurements from
nearby end devices through various communication protocols, e.g. Wi-Fi, BlueTooth,
ZigBee, and cellular network, and forward the results to the remote cloud [52]. The com-
mercially available products for a fog node candidate can be Intel Edison, Raspberry Pi,




Figure 2.2: Fog-empowered multi-level framework.
Considering the above benefits offered by fog architecture, we investigate how to
use fog/cloud hybrid architecture for privacy-preserving aggregation of smart metering.
Given a daily profile, spatially aggregated over a total of n smart meters, an important
challenge is how to perform multi-level aggregation in a privacy-preserving manner that
respects data confidentiality without sacrificing utility, especially when the data aggre-
gator is untrusted. In order to support this application, cloud computing alone is not
efficient enough as the requirements of privacy protection and the huge communication
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cost pose obstacles in cloud. In the scenario where the remote cloud is only concerned
with the overall aggregation of all regions over time, the individual measurements in
each region can be aggregated at the nearby fog node and then privately forwarded in a
compact form to the cloud. Hence, fog-empowered data aggregation in Chapter 6 aims to
explore how to derive multi-level aggregation, reduce transmission energy, and preserve
user privacy.
2.4 Adversary Models
• Semi-honest: In this case, the adversary is considered to be passive or honest-but-
curious, who tries to learn the private states of other parties, without deviating from
the protocol.
• Malicious: In this case, an active attacker tries to learn the private states of other
parties, and deviates arbitrarily from protocol by modifying, re-playing, or remov-
ing messages. This strong adversary model allows the adversary to conduct partic-
ularly devastating attacks.
2.5 Privacy Attacks
Privacy and confidentiality concerns pose barriers to more widespread use of private
data. For example, the private data collected from users could be used for unintended
purposes (e.g., face recognition, location-based services, or mobile health applications
for targeted social advertising and recommendation), posing the immediate or potential
privacy risks, hence private data should not be directly shared without any privacy con-
sideration. Even the trained models or model predictions can reveal data privacy [14,58]
as models with high capacity can simply memorize the training data, especially the mod-
ern deep learning models have vastly more capacity than they need to perform well on
their tasks, as evidenced by the following privacy attacks.
1. Model inversion attack: Given a model and a known output, the model inver-
sion attack tries to infer the values of sensitive attributes. To this end, the attacker
trains a machine learning model that learns the hidden features by following the
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gradients of the error with respect to the hidden input features so as to minimize
the error between the predicted output and the known output. As a result of this
reverse-engineering, the attacker can recover prototypical examples from the train-
ing set. Fredrikson et al. [59] demonstrated two cases: one case study of model
inversion attack was on pharmacogenetics analysis, where the correlation between
a patient’s genotype and the dosage of a certain medicine were captured by train-
ing an adversarial model to infer disease information about the patient; another
case study was in reconstructing the face of an individual in a face recognition sys-
tem, provided that the particular face label is given. In fact, it has been shown that
these prototypical examples simply correspond to the average of the input features
that characterize the corresponding output, i.e., class representatives, but do not
represent any actual member of the training set [14].
2. Model extraction attack: A privacy breach occurs if an adversary can reconstruc-
t/steal model in practice through prediction APIs, which is known as model extrac-
tion attack [58]. In specific, an adversary extracts important parameters of a model
that is trained on private data, and uses these parameters to train an adversarial
model to mimic the performance of the original model.
3. Membership inference attack: Another recent attack called membership inference
attack is proposed by Shokri et al. [14], which ideally applies to any type of machine
learning models. Given an input record and black-box access to the target model,
the aim of an adversary is to determine if the input record comes from the training
data of the target model or not, i.e., its membership. In particular, an attack model is
trained to recognize differences in the target model’s predictions on the inputs that
it trained on versus the inputs that it did not encounter during training. The attack
model performs binary classification on a data record, which indicates whether this
data record belongs to the training set of the target model or not, depending on the
class of the data record and the output of the target model on it. Also the attack
model is itself composed of a set of models, one for each of the output classes of the
target model. To train the attack model, shadow models are built which are of the
same architecture and type as of the target model, hence are close in behaviour to
the target model.
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4. Secrete extraction attacks: Orthogonal to membership inference, Carlini et al. [15]
showed that recurrent language models trained on text data are capable of memo-
rizing unique patterns in the training data, and an adversary can reconstruct spe-
cific training points (a random secret number) with black-box access to the model
given some prior knowledge about the format of the input (e.g., credit card num-
ber). For a text generation model, numbers are essentially random data, thus this il-
lustrates that models can memorize random data. Moreover, Song et al. [60] showed
that text-generation models can memorize even words and sentences that are di-
rectly related to their primary task without a negative impact on the test accuracy.
Therefore, neither the private training data nor the derived model or model prediction
shall be directly shared with any untrusted parties, motivating the relevant works in this
thesis.
2.6 Privacy-Preserving Techniques
There exists a growing body of literatures on semantic privacy-preserving techniques,
which are concerned with minimising the difference between adversarial prior and pos-
terior knowledge about the individuals represented in a database. This section reviews
the current privacy-preserving methodologies that have been developed in this area, in-
cluding encryption, randomization, and differential privacy.
2.6.1 Privacy-Preservation through Encryption
There exist cryptographic techniques that allow algorithms to be modified to process
encrypted data, these techniques fall under the heading of secure multiparty computation
(SMC) [61]. SMC ensures a high level of privacy and accuracy, but the main challenge
facing SMC-based schemes is the requirement for simultaneous coordination of all par-
ticipants during the entire training process, which limits the number of participants.
On the other hand, using public key cryptography in all communications is costly
and time consuming, which is unacceptable for resource limited end nodes. Considering
computational complexity of asymmetric encryption and efficiency of symmetric encryp-
tion, one alternative solution is to use public key cryptography to transfer the symmetric
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encryption key, which is actually used to encrypt the released statistics. In such a cryp-
tosystem, a shared secret key (pseudo-random session key) is generated in advance, and
this much briefer session key is then encrypted by the recipient’s public key. Only the
recipient can use the corresponding private key to obtain the session key, then use the
session key to decrypt the received ciphertext.
For aggregation tasks, the additive homomorphic property is desired. A homomor-
phic encryption scheme allows arithmetic operations to be directly performed on cipher-
texts, which is equivalent to a specific linear algebraic manipulation with the plaintext.
It is especially useful when someone who does not have the corresponding decryption
key needs to perform arithmetic operations on a set of ciphertexts. For example, for
fog-empowered aggregation, fog level and cloud level aggregation can be obtained by
decrypting the sum of ciphertexts using additively homomorphic encryption. The fully
homomorphic encryption focuses on homomorphic operations on ciphertexts encrypted
under the same key [62], which is inapplicable for aggregation purpose. Because if users
encrypt their data with the aggregator’s public key, the aggregator could gain both the
aggregate statistics and each user’s plaintext. Well-known partially homomorphic en-
cryption schemes include: RSA [63], El Gamal [64], Paillier [65], etc. Specifically, we
implement additively homomorphic encryption using exponential ElGamal [66] in Chap-
ter 5 and efficient stream cipher [19] in Chapter 6.
2.6.2 Privacy-Preservation through Randomization
To dispense with the additional, high-overhead cryptographic mechanisms, most
randomization-based schemes use alternative semantic privacy criteria/definitions. For
Random Multiparty Perturbation (RMP), we use the criterion called recovery resistance. This
criterion is based on the recovery rate metric used in Sang et al.’s innovative study of at-
tacks on randomization-based schemes [67].
In general, randomization techniques include (i) additive perturbation, (ii) multiplica-
tive perturbation, (iii) geometric perturbation, and (iv) nonlinear transformation.
Additive perturbation adds independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise to
the original data [3], but Kargupta et al. [68] and Huang et al. [69] questioned the use of
random additive noise and pointed out that additive noise can be easily filtered out in
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many cases. The general principle is that the additive noise should be correlated with
the data [70], but applying this principle to data that is not time-series is problematic, be-
cause the additive noise can be filtered to a good approximation of the original data [69].
Moreover, a participant can infer the data of another participant if their data happen to
be correlated [71].
Multiplicative perturbation premultiplies the original data with a random noise ma-
trix. Well-known multiplicative schemes include:
• Rotation perturbation defines the noise matrix as a matrix with orthonormal rows
and columns [72]. This scheme is vulnerable to ”known-input attacks” [73], where
an attacker can recover the original data from its perturbed version with just a few
leaked inputs.
• Random projection (abbreviated as RP) leverages the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma by
defining the noise matrix as a matrix whose columns have unit lengths [74]. The
idea of random projection originated in the following seminal theorem:
Lemma 2.1. (Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma [75]) Given 0 < ε < 12 , a set M of m points
in Rn, upon projection to a uniform random w-dimensional subspace where w ≥ 9 ln m
ε2− 23 ε3
+
1, the following property holds: with probability at least 12 , for every pair x1, x2 ∈ M,
(1− ε)‖x1 − x2‖22 ≤ ‖ f (x1)− f (x2)‖22 ≤ (1 + ε)‖x1 − x2‖22. (2.1)
where f (x1), f (x2) are the projections of x1 and x2.
Lemma 2.1 shows that any set of m points in a n-dimensional space can be embed-
ded into an O( ln m
ε2
) dimensional space such that the pairwise distance of any two
points is maintained with a high probability (within an arbitrarily small factor).
This beautiful property implies that by projecting the data onto a lower dimen-
sional random space through random projection (RP), we can dramatically change
its original form while preserving much of its distance-related characteristics.
From a third party’s perspective, these guarantees imply that (a) the users who are
close in the original space are likely to remain close in the transformed space and
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(b) similarly the users who are far apart are likely to remain so after the transforma-
tions. RP matrices can be generated in multiple ways, including:
– Drawing each entry of the matrix independently from the normal distribution
N(0, 1/w) [74, 76].





























– Generating each entry of the matrix by randomised hashing, with the resultant
matrix being a sparse matrix [78, 79].
Liu et al. [80] showed that if the original data set with n attributes is multiplied by
a w × n (w < n) mixing matrix, which is random and orthogonal in expectation,
then the perturbed data with reduced dimension can be released for learning pur-
pose while preserving much of its distance-related characteristics. However, Sang
et al. [67] and Liu et al. [81] addressed the possible risks of RP by studying how well
an attacker can recover the original data from the transformed data with the aid of
prior information: if the original data follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution,
a large portion of the data can be reconstructed via maximum a posteriori (MAP) esti-
mation. Both rotation perturbation and random projection are distance-preserving
transformations, which are good for preserving accuracy, but susceptible to attacks
that exploit distance relationships [73]. A large portion of the data can be recon-
structed via attacks to distance-preserving transformations [70, 71]. Mukherjee et
al. [82] propose enabling distance-based mining algorithms over private data using
Fourier-related transforms, but their approach has the same drawbacks as Liu et
al. [80]. In order to resist MAP estimation attacks in distance-related applications,
we introduce nonlinear transformation as a pre-RP step to condition the pdf of the
perturbed data [83].
• Uniform random transformation (abbreviated as RT) defines the noise matrix as a ma-
trix whose elements are independently sampled from the same uniform distribu-
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tion U(0, 1) [24]. As shown in Proposition 4.1, RT does not preserve the distance be-
tween data points, this has the advantage of making attacks on distance-preserving
transformations [73] not applicable, and it does not distort the distance significantly
for low-dimensional data. In particular, RT is used in RMP, where the noise matrix
is a projection matrix whose elements are independently sampled from the uniform
distribution U(0, 1).
Geometric perturbation uses a mix of additive and multiplicative perturbations [84],
where the data matrix X is mapped to RX + Φ + ∆, where R is a rotation perturbation
matrix, Φ is a random translation matrix with identical entries, and ∆ is an i.i.d. Gaussian
noise matrix [72]. It is known that without ∆, geometric perturbation is vulnerable to
“known input attacks” [73], but there are no general results on how the ∆ term influences
the effectiveness of these attacks. All the randomization techniques discussed so far are
linear techniques.
Nonlinear transformation is meant to be used in conjunction with linear tech-
niques to thwart Bayesian estimation attacks. The general randomization takes the form
B + Q · N(A + RX), where B, Q, A, R are random matrices, and N is a bounded non-
linear function [85]. The tanh function is found to preserve the distance between nor-
mal data points, but collapse the distance between outliers, making the function suitable
for privacy-preserving anomaly detection [85], provided only the privacy of anomalous
records needs to be protected.
The summary of the properties of different randomization techniques are illustrated
in Figure 2.3.
To resist both MAP and ICA attacks, Random Multiparty Perturbation (RMP) [83] com-
bines RT and nonlinear transformation. The innovations of RMP include (i) the use of
participant-specific RT matrices, and (ii) the use of the double logistic function as the non-
linear transformation function for protecting both anomalous and normal records from
MAP estimation attacks. However, the privacy-preserving properties of the double lo-
gistic function have not been thoroughly assessed.
Following RMP, Lyu et al. [35] propose an improved two-stage perturbation scheme,
which relies on a nonlinear transformation and participant-specific U(0, 1)-distributed
multiplication matrix to resist both MAP and ICA attacks [35]. The improvements in-






















































Figure 2.3: Properties of different randomization techniques.
clude the use of the repeated Gompertz function as the nonlinear transformation function
for protecting both anomalous and normal records from MAP estimation attacks, and
empirical evidence of the advantages of this alternative in terms of the improved recov-
ery resistance of RMP.
In this thesis, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 realize privacy-preservation through data ran-
domization using the defined metric of recovery rate to asses how much information can
be recovered from the perturbed data. To quantify the privacy leakage formally, Chap-
ter 5 and Chapter 6 use differential privacy for privacy-preservation as follows.
2.6.3 Privacy-Preservation through Differential Privacy
Dwork et al. [86] first proposed a now standard semantic privacy criterion of differential
privacy (DP) for the single database scenario, where for every query made, a database
server answers queries in a privacy-preserving manner with tailored randomization to the
response to the query [86]. In comparison with encryption and randomization, differen-
tial privacy trades off privacy and accuracy by perturbing the data in a way that is (i)
computationally efficient, (ii) does not allow an attacker to recover the original data, and
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(iii) does not severely affect the utility. In such schemes, the participants perturb their
records or statistics before sending them to the central server or other participants.
Differential privacy provides the theoretical foundation for determining the amount
of noise to add to query answers in the statistical disclosure scenario, and does not place
limitations on the prior knowledge of the adversary, while ensuring that an attacker with
significant prior knowledge and unlimited computational resources cannot determine
the presence or absence of a user in the dataset. The concept of differential privacy is
that if a tuple is removed from a dataset, the effect on the output likelihood is within a
multiplicative factor 1 + ε.
ε-Differential Privacy











for all measurable S ⊆ range(A), and all neighbouring pairs D1, D2, where D1 and D2
differ in at most one tuple.
Eq. (2.2) can be more easily understood in the following form on probability masses








) ∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε (2.3)
for any output o ∈ range(A) with non-zero support, and all neighbouring database D1,
D2, where D1 and D2 differ in at most one record.
In the above equations, the level of indistinguishability is represented by the privacy
parameter ε, where the lower the value of ε, the higher the level of privacy, and more
noise is required. ε-DP can be attained by adding random noise whose scale is selected
through a mechanism that can affect the largest probability of an individual being iden-
tified through the query algorithm.
In particular, the level of noise is typically dependent on the sensitivity of the query
function, i.e., variation that the removal or substitution of one tuple can cause on the out-
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put. In the case of the aggregate count statistic (counting the number of records evaluated
to true by any fixed predicte), it is well-known that the sensitivity equals to ∆( f ) = 1.
However, in many real-world applications, release statistics are real-valued and more
complex than a sum, sensitivity must be defined separately. The global sensitivity of a
given query indicates the maximum variation of the query output when removing or
substituting one element from the database [86].
For answering a recurring query sequence, where the query function f returns a d-
dimensional vector (d > 1) as the query output, we may use Vector Sensitivity of the query
function f as the L2 global sensitivity. Formally, let f : X n → Rd be the query function
for answering a query sequence with d queries, the Vector Sensitivity of f is defined as:
Definition 2.1. (Vector Sensitivity). For two neighboring datasets D and D′, the L2 sensitivity
of the query function f : X n → Rd is expressed as:
∆2 f = argmax
D,D′
‖ f (D)− f (D′)‖2. (2.4)
ε-differential privacy can be achieved by different mechanisms, among which,
Laplace mechanism relies on adding controlled noise to the vector-valued statistics that
we want to release. The probability density function of Laplace distribution with µ=0
is: lap(x|b)= 12b e
− |x|b . Here the variance of Laplace distribution equals σ2 = 2b2. Others,
like the exponential mechanism [88] and posterior sampler [89] sample from a problem-
dependent family of distributions instead for private maximisation and approximate
Bayesian inference, respectively.
Differential privacy has two important composition properties:
• Sequential Composition: differential privacy provided by a set of mechanisms Mi
each preserving εi-differential privacy with results on the same database, concate-
nated, is Σiε i.
• Parallel Composition: if every mechanism Mi is executed on disjoint subsets Di of the
private database D, the privacy preserved will be max(ε i)-DP.
Theorem 2.1. (Sequential composition on independent data [90]). Suppose that Mt satisfies
εt-DP for each t ∈ [1, T]. A combined mechanism {Mt, · · · , Mt+j} satisfies ∑
k=t+j
k=t εk-DP.
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(ε, δ)-Differential Privacy
(ε, δ)-approximate differential privacy [22] relaxes pure ε-differential privacy by a delta
additive term. Unlikely responses need not satisfy the pure differential privacy criterion.
Definition 2.2. (ε, δ)-differential privacy [22]. For scalars ε > 0 and 0 ≤ δ < 1, mechanismM
is said to preserve (approximate) (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for all adjacent datasets D, D′ ∈ Dn










The definition of “adjacent datasets” depends on the application. Most prior work
on differentially private machine learning, e.g., [44, 91–94] deals with example-level pri-
vacy: two datasets D and D′ are defined to be adjacent if D′ can be formed by adding or
removing a single training example from D.
To achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy, Dwork and Roth describe Gaussian Mecha-
nism [22, Theorem A.1] which adds independent noise scaled to N(0, σ2) to each element
of the output, as stated in Theorem 2.2, where 0 < ε < 1.
Theorem 2.2. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. For c2 > 2ln(1.25/δ), the Gaussian mechanism with
parameter σ ≥ c∆2 f /ε is (ε, δ)-differentially private, where ∆2 f refers to the L2 sensitivity of
query function f . For one-dimensional real-valued functions, the added noise should follow the
Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2). For high-dimensional functions in Rd, the added noise should
follow the Gaussian distribution N (0, Σ), where Σ is a diagonal matrix with entries σ.
To avoid the worst-case scenario of always violating privacy of a δ fraction, the stan-
dard recommendation is to choose δ  1/N, where N is the size of the database. This
strategy forecloses possibility of one particularly devastating outcome, but other forms
of information leakage remain. However, unlike pure differential privacy, there are sit-
uations where the approximate differential privacy is not a very elegant abstraction for
mathematical analysis, particularly the analysis of composition. There exist valid rea-
sons for preferring the Gaussian mechanism over Laplace: (i) the noise comes from the
same Gaussian distribution (closed under convolution) as the error that may already
be present in the dataset; (ii) the standard deviation of the noise is proportional to the
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query’s L2 sensitivity, which is no larger and often much smaller than L1 sensitivity; (iii)
for the same standard deviation, the tails of the Gaussian distribution decay much faster
(more concentrated) than those of the Laplace (exponential) distribution, and so better
utility is expected. Another common reason for bringing in (ε, δ)-differential privacy
is application of the advanced composition theorem, as shown in Theorem 2.4, which
provides a stronger privacy guarantee compared with the basic composition theorem in
Theorem 2.3. Consider the case of k-fold adaptive composition of an (ε, δ)-DP mecha-
nism. For any δ′ > 0, it holds that the composite mechanism is (ε′, kδ + δ′)-DP, where
ε′ =
√
2kln(1/δ′)ε + kε(eε − 1) [95].
Theorem 2.3. Basic composition theorem of (ε, δ)-differential privacy (the epsilons and the deltas
add up): the composition of m differentially private mechanisms is (∑iεi, ∑iδi)-differentially pri-
vate, where for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the ith mechanism Mi is (εi, δi)-differentially private.
Theorem 2.4. Advanced composition theorem of (ε, δ)-differential privacy [95] (subsequently




A key property of DP is the post-processing guarantee [22]: any data-independent
computation applied on the output of an (ε, δ)-DP randomized algorithm remains (ε, δ)-
DP.
The most recent progress in DP uses the privacy definitions of Concentrated Differen-
tial Privacy (CDP) by Dwork and Rothblum [98], followed by zero-Concentrated Differential
Privacy (zCDP) by Bun and Steinke [99]. They are framed using the language of, respec-
tively, subgaussian tails and the Rényi divergence. Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP) is
recently introduced by Mironov [100]. RDP is closely related to (zero)-Concentrated Dif-
ferential Privacy [98, 99]. Both Concentrated and zero-Concentrated DP require a linear
bound on all positive moments of a privacy loss variable. By contrast, Rényi DP ap-
plies to one moment at a time, thus facilitating tracking privacy budget across multiple
queries. Although less restrictive, it allows for more accurate numerical analysis.
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Distributed Differential Privacy (DDP)
Differential privacy was designed for the scenario where a trusted database server, which
is entitled to see all participants’ data in the clear, wishes to publish statistics or answer
queries in a privacy-preserving manner by randomizing query results [86]. In such a
scenario, the database comprises private data of multiple individuals. However, for the
scenario where data are sourced from multiple sensitive databases, while the aggrega-
tor is untrusted or no aggregator exists, for example, in a participatory sensing scenario,
participants are data owners who publish data (instead of answering queries) about them-
selves alone, a distributed version of differential privacy—Distributed Differential Privacy
(DDP)—is needed [10, 50]. The notion of DDP reflects the fact that the noise in the target
statistic is sourced from multiple parties.
In the same year differential privacy was proposed, Dwork et al. [50] proposed the
protocol called “Our Data, Ourselves” (ODO) to achieve differential privacy through dis-
tributed randomness. However, the main challenge of ODO is the cooperative generation
of noise, which incurred a cost of O(n) multiplications and additions in shares. Further-
more, it requires pairwise secure channels among parties, which is incompatible with
scenarios where parties do not realistically share pairwise connections with each other,
such as smart grids.
Shi et al. [10] first defined DDP for neighboring vectors that differ in exactly one coor-
dinate; we reformulate DDP for decentralized aggregation in Chapter 5.
For aggregation tasks, to ensure differential privacy for the target statistic (aggrega-
tion), the target statistic must contain random noise of an appropriate magnitude. One
naive solution is to rely on a single participant to add the required magnitude of noise.
However, this solution is problematic, because this designated participant knows the
noise and hence can deduce from the output the true aggregate value. In real-world set-
tings, participants may not trust each other. In particular, a subset of the participants may
be compromised and collude with the data aggregator. In the worst case, for a total of N
participants, if every participant believes that the other N − 1 participants may be com-
promised and collude with the aggregator, each participant would need to add sufficient
noise to ensure local differential privacy (LDP). The resulting statistic would accumulate
significant error. If at least a fraction of the participants are honest and not compromised,
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then we can distribute the noise generation task amongst these honest participants.
Theorem 2.5. (Cramér’s decomposition theorem [101]) If X and Y are independent real-valued
random variables whose sum X + Y is a normal random variable, then both X and Y must be
normal as well.
One way to realize DDP is the use of a stable Gaussian distribution to perturb individ-
ual statistics. By induction from Cramér’s decomposition in Theorem 2.5, for any finite
sum of independent real-valued random normal variables, their summands must also be
normal. This nice decomposition property of Gaussian distribution facilitates the distri-
bution of noise generation among all parties, who jointly generate the required noise r
with standard deviation σ in the aggregate statistic, thus each party may add less noise
(σi = σ√n ), and as long as the noise in the desired statistic (aggregation/sum/average)
has an expected standard deviation of σ, privacy can be guaranteed.
However, since DDP collects noise from all parties, only the sum of the individually
released statistics is differentially private but not the individually shared statistics, i.e.,
∑ri is sufficient for differential privacy, but ri alone is not sufficient, thus xi + ri cannot
be released directly, here xi indicates the plaintext. Therefore, this necessitates the help
of cryptographic techniques to maintain utility and ensure aggregator obliviousness, as
evidenced in [8–10,102]. Different schemes for differentially private aggregation are out-
lined in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Differences between differentially private aggregation schemes.
Schemes Untrusted
aggregator




Yes Yes Yes Yes DFT Yes
Shi et al. [10] Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Ács et al. [8] Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Lyu et
al. [102]
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
In distributed scenario, without the help of cryptographic techniques, each partici-
pant has to add enough calibrated noise to ensure LDP, the aggregated noise leads to
huge utility degradation. This inspires us to explore DDP using stable distributions to
ensure differential privacy of the target statistic, while preserving individual privacy by
combing DDP with cryptosystem in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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2.7 Summary
Most of the current machine learning frameworks require a central server to build a
global model on all participants’ data, aggregate local statistics, or mediate the collabora-
tive learning process. While the benefits brought by server-based frameworks are encour-
aging in various applications, there exists some inherent limitations. Decentralized ma-
chine learning aims to overcome these limitations by parallelizing computation among
participants. On the other hand, fog-empowered data aggregation is well positioned for
real-time large-scale IoT network. However, there are increasing concerns about the pri-
vacy leakage of sensitive information in both machine learning and data aggregation.
To address these concerns, privacy-preserving techniques have enabled to extract use-
ful knowledge from the combined data or local statistics without compromising utility.
This chapter presents an overview of different machine learning frameworks, adversary
models, privacy attacks, and systematically investigates various privacy-preserving tech-
niques, including encryption, data randomization, and differential privacy. It has noted
that the main objective of privacy-preserving machine learning and data aggregation are











With regards to real-world applications, our first example of privacy-preserving machine
learning is collaborative anomaly detection. Anomaly detection is important for tasks
such as security, fault diagnosis, intrusion detection, and monitoring applications. Given
the possibility that a cloud service is honest but curious, a major challenge is to protect the
participants’ privacy when collaborating via a cloud server. In order to identify anoma-
lies in the combined data from multiple participants, it is necessary to build an anomaly
detection model on the server. However, considering privacy issues of forwarding raw
sensitive data to the server, Erfani et al. [83] proposed a privacy-preserving collabora-
tive anomaly detection scheme called Random Multiparty Perturbation (RMP) that allows
participants to perturb their tabular data by passing the data through a nonlinear func-
tion, and projecting the perturbed data to a lower dimension using a participant-specific
random matrix. The perturbation process of RMP consists of a nonlinear transformation
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stage and a linear projection stage. The nonlinear stage is used to condition the proba-
bility density function (pdf) of the perturbed data to thwart maximum a posteriori (MAP)
estimation attacks, whereas the linear stage is to compress the data to resist independent
component analysis (ICA) attacks. The nonlinear transformation function of RMP is the
double logistic function, but the privacy-preserving properties of this function have not
been thoroughly assessed. As such, we propose an improvement to RMP by introducing
a new nonlinear function. The improved scheme is assessed in terms of its recovery re-
sistance to MAP estimation attack, and it is shown to deliver better recovery resistance
and an improved trade-off between accuracy and privacy.
3.1 The Improved RMP
We propose a nonlinear transformation function called “repeated Gompertz”, and exper-
imentally demonstrate that the proposed repeated Gompertz function is more resistant
to MAP estimation attacks than the double logistic function proposed in [83]. The general
participatory sensing architecture is depicted in Figure 3.1. It comprises a set of partic-
ipants C = {ci|i = 1, . . . , q}, a cloud service S , and a set of end-users U . The cloud
service is assumed to be honest but curious, i.e., it will never perform any malicious ac-
tion to disrupt the protocols or compromise the participants but it might try to discover
privacy-sensitive information of the participants, including colluding with some of the
participants. RMP here considers the case where (i) the main learning task is anomaly
detection, and (ii) scalability requirement necessitates the use of a randomisation-based
scheme. Based on the state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving research, the following de-
sign criteria are considered:
• Resilience to distance inference attacks: Uniform random transformation [24]
does not preserve the angle (inner product) or Euclidean distance between trans-
formed data points, and is thus resistant to distance inference attacks. Moreover, it
is suitable for anomaly detection [83].
• Resilience to Bayesian estimation attacks: Bayesian estimation is a general at-
tack that exploits the pdf of the original data. Gaussian data is particularly ex-
3.1 The Improved RMP 41
ploitable because it reduces the MAP estimation problem to a simple convex opti-
misation [67]. A nonlinear transformation can be applied to condition the pdf.
• Resilience to collusion: Let Xi ∈ Rn×mi be the dataset of participant ci, where
mi and n denote the number of records and features respectively. If participant ci
perturbs its records as Zi = TXi, where T ∈ Rw×n, w < n, is a random matrix
shared by all participants, then leakage of T due to collusion with the cloud service
S can compromise the privacy of all the other participants. Preventing collusion
requires each participant to use an independent perturbation matrix.
Figure 3.1: The general participatory sensing architecture.
RMP’s two-stage data perturbation scheme was designed with the preceding crite-
ria in mind. Let T be a w × n matrix (w < n) with U(0, 1)-distributed elements. Each
participant ci generates a unique perturbation matrix
T̃i = T + ∆i, (3.1)
where each element of ∆i is drawn from U(−α, α), and 0 < α < 1, which indicates the
level of imposed noise in RMP anomaly detection. Experimental results show that for
small values of α, the accuracy loss in anomaly detection is small [83]. Suppose partici-
pant ci is contributing data Xi ∈ Rn×mi to the cloud service S for anomaly detection. The
participant transforms Xi to Zi ∈ Rw×mi in two stages:
Stage 1: Participant ci transforms Xi to Yi, by applying the nonlinear perturbation
function N element-wise:
Yi = N(Xi). (3.2)
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In the original version of RMP, N is defined as the double logistic function. Here for the










where the parameters a1, b1, c1, d1, a2, b2, c2, d2 are defined in Figure 3.2, and u() is the
Heaviside step function. The derivation of the function parameters is explained in
Sect. 3.2. Figure 3.2 plots different nonlinear perturbation functions for comparison.
Stage 2: Using T̃i generated earlier in Eq. 3.1, the participant transforms Yi to Zi:
Zi = T̃iYi. (3.4)
The participant then sends Zi to the cloud service S . Once S receives all the perturbed
datasets Zi, i = 1, . . . , q, it concatenates them as: Zall = [Z1| · · · |Zq], and then trains an
anomaly detection model on Zall. The learned model M can be used by end-users to
identify anomalies in their test records. RMP is independent of the anomaly detection
algorithm used: denoising autoencoder (DAE) is used for anomaly detection, forward
reference to Sec 3.3.2 for more details.
3.2 Privacy Analysis
3.2.1 Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) Estimation Attack
Corresponding to multiplicative perturbation, we use a specific privacy-preserving def-
inition: a perturbation scheme is privacy-preserving with respect to an attack A and a
data distribution pD if only a small fraction of the original data, characterised by pD,
can be recovered from the perturbed data through A. This definition has three major
components:
• the reference attack;
• the data distribution, which captures an aspect of the attacker’s auxiliary informa-
tion;









































Figure 3.2: Parameters of the repeated Gompertz function, and a plot of different nonlin-
ear perturbation functions. The tanh function is N(x) = tanh(βtx), where βt ≈ 1.23 [83].
The double logistic function is N(x) = 1 − exp(−βdlx2), where βdl ≈ 2.81 [83]. The
repeated Gompertz function is defined as per Eq. (3.3).
• the recovery rate, which captures the notions of “small fraction” and “recovered”.
To specify the reference attack, we first consider attacks to linear multiplicative per-
turbation schemes. These types of schemes project the whole data matrix to a lower
dimensional space so that an attacker has only an ill-posed problem in the form of an un-
derdetermined system of linear equations Ty = z to work with, where z is a projection of
vector y. An underdetermined system cannot be solved for y exactly, but given sufficient
prior information about y, an approximation of the true y may be attainable. Below, we
characterise an attack by the extent of prior information available to the attacker.
In a known input-output attack, the attacker has some input samples and all samples of
the perturbed data, and knows which input sample corresponds to which output sample
[73]. In the participatory sensing scenario where the cloud service may collude with one
or more participants to unravel other participants’ data, the known input-output attack
is an immediate concern. In the following, our privacy analysis is conducted with re-
spect to a known input-output attack based on MAP estimation — this is our reference
attack. MAP estimation is based on Bayesian statistics and is more general than maxi-
mum likelihood estimation because the former takes an arbitrary prior distribution into
account.
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To measure the strength of the reference attack, we define the recovery rate. If for a
data vector x the recovered copy is x̂, then the relative error is ξ def= ‖x̂− x‖2/‖x‖2, where
‖ · ‖2 is the Euclidean norm. Denote the joint distribution of ξ and x by pΞ,X(ξ, x), then








pΞ,X(ξ, x)dx dξ, (3.5)
where Dx is the domain of the data vector, and x is normalised. The joint distribution
pΞ,X depends on the attack A and data distribution pD. In the absence of an analytical
expression for Eq. (3.5), we estimate the recovery rate as the fraction of test data that can
be recovered to within a relative error of ε. At this point, we state the privacy definition
formally as follows.
Definition 3.1. A probabilistic algorithm that takes pD-distributed x ∈ Rn as input and pro-
duces z ∈ Rw as output is (ε, δ)-recovery resistant with respect to pD and attack algorithm
A if rε(A, pD) = δ.
Suppose the attacker is targeting a particular participant by trying to solve Z = TY
for Y. We consider two scenarios: where T is known, and where T is unknown.
• Scenario where random matrix T is known. This is the worst-case scenario and here,
we assume the attacker somehow knows T exactly but not Y, for example when
the attacker manages to predict the output of the victim’s improperly initialised
pseudorandom number generator (in fact, such a vulnerability was discovered on
the Android mobile platform in mid-2013). Let z represent a column of Z, and y
represent a column of Y. The MAP estimate of y, given T and z, is
ŷ ∈ arg max
y













where Y = {y : z = Ty}.
– The factor p(z|T, y) translates to the constraint y ∈ Y .
– The integral in the denominator does not contribute towards maximising y.
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If y is n-variate Gaussian with a positive definite covariance matrix, then Eq. (3.6)
becomes an easily solvable quadratic programming problem [67, Theorem 1]. The
key is to design a nonlinear function N that transforms a potentially Gaussian data
distribution to a distribution that deters accurate solution of Eq. (3.6).
For nonlinear function, Bhaduri et al. [85] proposed tanh, i.e., N(x) = tanh(βtx),
where βt is a tunable parameter. As a suitable value of βt, we pick




[tanh(βx)− x]2 dx ≈ 1.23.
Erfani et al. [83] proposed using the double logistic function, i.e., N(x) =
sign(x)[1− exp(−βdlx2)], where




[1− exp(−βx2)− x]2 dx ≈ 2.81.
We propose “repeated Gompertz” function defined in Eq. (3.3) as the nonlinear
function. The design principles of the proposed function are explained as follows.




where the parameter a specifies the upper asymptote, b controls the displacement
along the x axis, and c adjusts the growth rate of the function. As tanh(βtx) is good
for protecting anomalous data points, the repeated Gompertz function is given
slopes that approximate those of tanh(βtx) at x = 0 and x = 1. In order to pro-
tect normal data points, the repeated Gompertz function is also designed to have a
flat middle section so that for that section the function cannot be inverted. Through
extensive search, we found the geometry in Figure 3.2 to be good for protecting both
anomalous and normal data points: (i) a Gompertz curve presenting a steep slope
over the interval [0, 0.35]; and (ii) another Gompertz curve presenting a plateau
over the interval [0.35, 0.6], a steeper slope over the interval [0.6, 0.75] and another
plateau over the interval [0.75, 1]. The parameters of the two Gompertz functions
are given in Figure 3.2. This compositional structure inspired the name “repeated
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Gompertz”.
Both tanh and double logistic function are readily invertible, while repeated Gom-
pertz is not, thus making an analytical expression of the transformed pdf unavail-
able even if the pdf of the original random variable is available. It means there does
not exist a distribution of x for which the attacker can find an analytical expression
for p(y) in Eq.(3.6), where y is the result of applying repeated Gompertz to x.
• Scenario where random matrix T is unknown. Consider the case where the attacker
knows neither T nor Y. The MAP estimates of Y and T, given Z, are











where Θ ∈ {(T, Y) : Z = TY}. In a known input-output attack, p(T) and p(Y)
are estimated as inputs to Eq. (3.8). Eq. (3.8) is a nonconvex optimisation problem
that is harder to solve than Eq. (3.6). The repeated Gompertz is designed to make
data recovery via Eq. (3.6) difficult when T is known. Now that T is unknown, the
attacker is expected to get an even lower recovery rate by solving Eq. (3.8), which
is a more difficult problem.
3.2.2 Underdetermined Independent Component Analysis (UICA) Attack
As a statistical technique, ICA represents a set of random variables as linear combinations
of statistically independent component variables. The aim of an ICA attack is to design
a filter that can recover the original signals from only the observed mixture. ICA can
separate out T and Y, knowing only their product Z = TY, provided (i) The number
of observed attributes is at least as large as the independent attributes, w ≥ n; (ii) the
attributes are independent; (iii) at most one of the attributes is Gaussian; (iv) T must
have full column rank. To resist an ICA attack, we enforce w < n, namely projecting data
to a lower-dimensional subspace to make the problem of ICA underdetermined. In this
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case, even if the perturbation matrix T is known, the independent components cannot be
obtained. Moreover, as shown in [80], if w ≤ (n + 1)/2, no linear filter can separate out
the observed mixture Z. It is demonstrated that an ICA attack cannot effectively breach
the privacy of participants after random projection-based perturbation.
3.3 Simulations and Evaluation
This section presents the simulation and evaluation results of the improved RMP in terms
of its privacy-preserving and accuracy-preserving properties. Since it is resistant to ICA,
the empirical experiments focus on the recovery rate of our scheme under the MAP esti-
mation attack and compare with earlier works, i.e., [80], [85] and [83].
Experiments are conducted on (i) purely Gaussian datasets, (ii) purely Laplace-
distributed datasets, (iii) seven real datasets from the UCI Machine Learning Repository1,
and (iv) two challenge synthetic datasets. Seven real datasets are (i) Abalone, (ii) Forest,
(iii) Adult, (iv) Gas, (v) OAR, (vi) DSA, and (vii) HAR, with dimensionalities of 8, 54, 123,
128, 110, 315 and 561 respectively. The two synthetic datasets are (i) Smiley with 20 fea-
tures, and (ii) GME with 100 features. The Smiley dataset consists of samples drawn from
two compact Gaussians and an arc shaped distribution to resemble a smiley face, and is
often used to challenge anomaly detection algorithms. The GME dataset is a mixture of
four separated Gaussians.
Among these datasets, HAR dataset [103] belongs to wearable data. The experiment
is carried out with a group of 30 volunteers. Each person performes six activities (WALK-
ING, WALKING UPSTAIRS, WALKING DOWNSTAIRS, SITTING, STANDING, LAY-
ING) wearing a smartphone (Samsung Galaxy S II) on the waist.
3.3.1 Privacy Evaluation
Experimental results are provided in this section on the recovery resistance of the im-
proved RMP against the MAP estimation attack, in terms of the ε-recovery rate defined
in Eq. (3.5). In the absence of an analytical expression for Eq. (3.5), we estimate the ε-
recovery rate as the fraction of test data that can be recovered to within a relative error of
1https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.php
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where xi and x̂i are the ith original data record and its attacker-estimated value respec-
tively.
To execute MAP estimation, the attacker can either apply the [67, Theorem 1] formula,
provided the original data is multivariate Gaussian distributed; or solve the constrained
optimisation problem (3.6). To solve optimisation problem (3.6), the attacker needs to
evaluate an objective function that is the pdf of the original data. For this, the attacker
can estimate the pdf of the original data as the pdf of the leaked input samples, using
multivariate kernel density estimation (KDE). For KDE, we use Ihler and Mandel’s Kernel
Density Estimation Toolbox for MATLAB2. Among the kernels supported, we use the
Epanechnikov kernel — which is optimal in the sense of the asymptotic mean integrated
squared error — with uniform weights.
Table 3.1: Evaluated schemes.
Scheme Nonlinear perturbation function
(stage 1)
Linear projection matrix (stage 2)
RP [80] none T ∼ Nw×n(0, 4)
tanh+RT tanh [85] T ∼ Uw×n(0, 1)
DL+RT [83] double logistic T ∼ Uw×n(0, 1)
RG+RT repeated Gompertz T ∼ Uw×n(0, 1)
The four schemes shown in Table 3.1 are evaluated in the worst-case scenario where
the attacker knows exactly the victim’s perturbation matrix.
Purely Gaussian datasets: Figure 3.3 shows that RG+RT provides significantly higher
recovery resistance for both normal and anomalous data compared to the other schemes,
except 0.2-recovery rate for anomalous data case, which is slightly less effective than RP.
2http://www.ics.uci.edu/˜ihler/code/kde.html
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Figure 3.3: Recovery rates of MAP estimation attacks against the evaluated schemes,
on w × 1000 data projected from 15× 1000 normalised Gaussian-distributed data (zero
mean, identity covariance matrix).
Purely Laplace datasets: Figure 3.4 shows that RG+RT significantly outperforms
other methods for Laplace datasets, and this is especially evident for normal data. In par-
ticular, for both normal data and anormalous data, the 0.2-recovery rate and 0.1-recovery
rate against RG+RT are below 10%. It should be noted that for anormalous data, the 0.2-
recovery rate and 0.1-recovery rate against tanh+RT are also below 10%, but still RG+RT
outperforms tanh + RT.
Assorted real and synthetic datasets: Consistent with the results for purely Gaussian
and purely Laplace datasets, as shown in Figure 3.5, RG+RT also outperforms tanh+RT
and DL+RT in terms of recovery resistance for both normal data and anomalous data.
Note the low recovery rates in many cases, especially for example, RG+RT achieves (0.1,
0)-recovery resistance for the DSA and HAR datasets. It should be noted that for DSA
and HAR datasets, all the other schemes also show negligible values.
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Figure 3.4: Recovery rates of MAP estimation attacks against the evaluated schemes, on
w× 1000 data projected from 15× 1000 normalised Laplace-distributed data (zero mean,
unity scale).
















































Figure 3.5: 0.1-recovery rates of the MAP estimation attack against the evaluated
schemes, on various datasets. The rank of the perturbation matrix, w, is set as b(n +
1)/2c, where n is the number of features. Note zero recovery rates in many cases.
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3.3.2 Accuracy Evaluation
The Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) is used to compare the anomaly detection ac-
curacy with and without data perturbation by our scheme. Without data perturbation,
the AUC should be close to 1. With data perturbation, the AUC is expected to decrease,
and the goal is to measure the extent of this decrement. Reducing data dimensionality
from n to w ≤ (n + 1)/2 ensures that no linear filter can recover the original data from its
perturbed version [80]. On the other hand, this raises the concern of utility loss.
For anomaly detection, a stacked denoising autoencoder (DAE) is used [104], the hy-
perparameters of the DAE are set based on the best performance on validation set. Each
dataset is normalised to [0, 1] and merged with 5% anomalous records, which are dis-
tributed between [0, 0.05] or [0.95, 1]. Anomalies are identified by DAE based on the
mean absolute error between the inputs and outputs of the training records. According
to three sigma rule, a well-known measure for anomaly detection, the reconstruction er-
ror is expected to be Gaussian distributed, hence 99.73% of the error values are expected
to be at most three standard deviations away from the mean, namely, within the thresh-
old µ(e) + 3σ(e). An error value larger than the threshold is unlikely and is identified as
an anomaly.
(a) T changes (b) T,N change
Figure 3.6: Impact of RG-RP scheme on AUC with T changes, and with T,N change. The
x-axis shows the percent reduction in the number of dimensions, (n− w)/n× 100%.
To study the performance of our method, two experiments are conducted. In the first
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experiment, the nonlinear function is set to N = RG with the fixed coefficients in Fig-
ure 3.2, while ∆i of each participant ci is randomly drawn from U(−0.1, 0.1). Figure 3.6(a)
shows the results for the first experiment, our two-stage scheme with changing T only
has minor impact on accuracy. During the second stage, reducing data dimensionality by
50% decreases the detection rate by at most 5% in the worst case. Our study also reveals
that RG+RT has better or similar AUC performance compared with tanh+RT and DL+RT.
In the second experiment, in addition to varying the transformation matrix T, the co-
efficients of the nonlinear function are also randomly modified for each participant. The
second experiment explores the impact of randomising both T and N, as opposed to only
randomising T. The coefficients are perturbed with some random noise, for example, ai
is perturbed as ai + ∆, for i = 1, 2, where ∆ is randomly drawn from a Gaussian dis-
tribution N(0, 1). While randomising the coefficients of the nonlinear transformation N
might be desirable, as it preserves privacy better, it is interesting to assess its impact on
accuracy. Figure 3.6(b) shows that randomising the coefficients of N has little impact on
the accuracy of DAE, i.e., reducing the accuracy not more than 1% compared to using a
fixed N as in Figure 3.6(a).
3.4 Summary
For cloud server-based privacy-preserving anomaly detection, we propose a two-stage
perturbation scheme, which uses a new nonlinear transformation function called “re-
peated Gompertz”. Our scheme maintains the privacy of both normal and anomalous
records in terms of resistance to both MAP estimation attacks and ICA attacks. We use
ε-recovery rate to evaluate the effectiveness of our scheme, it measures how much data can
be recovered within a relative error of ε. Extensive experiments on both real-world and
synthetic datasets demonstrate that our proposed repeated Gompertz function is more
resistant to MAP estimation attacks than the state-of-the-art nonlinear functions.





In ubiquitous computing, wearable Human Activity Recognition (HAR) is attracting sig-
nificant interest. HAR aims to recognise human activities via inertial, video or other
sensors, in support of ambient intelligence in smart environments, in which people with
care needs can be monitored and timely cared for, for example. Furthermore, with the
tremendous growth of data not only in volume, but also in the number of features, we
are motivated to investigate how to apply our proposed privacy-preserving schemes
to large-scale machine learning, such as human activity recognition. As a participant-
specific perturbation matrix breaks the relationship between data points by adding an
additional participant-specific noise to a uniform distributed matrix, this potentially lim-
its its application to distance-based data analyses. Hence, random transformation (e.g.,
RT of Chapter 3) is replaced with random projection (RP) in the second stage for more
accurate recognition.
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Movement information gathered from body-worn sensors are multivariate time-
series data with inherent local dependency characteristics and relatively high spatial and
temporal resolution. For analyzing this kind of data, hidden Markov models (HMMs) have
been widely used, owing to their capability for temporal pattern decoding. An HMM
assigns probability values over unbounded sequences. Since the probability values must
sum to one, the distribution described by the HMM is constrained. Recently, deep learn-
ing has emerged as a family of learning models that aim to model high-level abstractions
in data, and deep learning-empowered HAR is enjoying considerable attentions due to
its ability to learn deep structures of patterns [105]. Deep learning techniques have been
shown to outperform well-established methods that rely on hand-crafted feature extrac-
tion and shallow feature learning architectures, owing to its ability to uncover features
that are tied to the dynamics of human motion production, from simple motion encod-
ing in lower layers to more complex motion dynamics in upper layers, thus scaling up
activity recognition to more complex activities [106].
Among various deep learning models, Deep Belief Networks (DBN) use Restricted Boltz-
mann Machines (RBMs) for learning. By comparison, Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN)
are capable of encoding/learning sequential information, thus offering more discrimi-
native power over DBNs. Given a series of input signals {x1, . . . , xn}, their temporal
information can be extracted by LSTM [107] as follows:
it = σ(W1xt + W2ht−1),
c̃t = tanh(W3xt + W4ht−1),
ft = σ(W5xt + W6ht−1),
ot = σ(W7xt + W8ht−1),
ct = ct−1  ft + it  c̃t,
ht = ct  ot,
(4.1)
where the subscript t denotes the time window, operator  refers to component-wise
multiplication, σ is the logistic sigmoid function, and h and c are the hidden state and the
cell state respectively.
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4.1 Distance-Preserving Multiplicative Perturbation
Euclidean distance-preserving data perturbation [72,108] has been receiving attention as
it delivers a promising trade-off between privacy and accuracy. Assume an organization
owns a private, real-valued database X (row: features, column: data records) and wishes
to make it publicly available for data analysis while keeping individual records private.
To accomplish this, Y = TX can be released to the public, where T preserves Euclidean
distances between columns and is only known to the data owner. In this way, many com-
mon learning algorithms, with only minor modification, can be applied to Y and produce
similar patterns that would be extracted from X. Random projection preserves Euclidean
distance and is especially suitable for high-dimensional data analysis. The reduced di-
mensions are not a subset of the original dimensions but rather a transformation, which
is relevant for privacy preservation.




, where i = 1, . . . , w, j = 1, . . . , n, and
w < n. Given some distribution D, if tij ∼ D is i.i.d., we write T ∼ Dw×n. Below, we
consider two types of distributions (and hence two types of T) in terms of their ability to
preserve Euclidean distances and inner products in Proposition 4.1. Random projection
has been proved to preserve Euclidean distances and inner products between data points
in expectation [109, Appendix 5.6.1]. We further prove that uniform transformation using
uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1] does not preserve Euclidean distances and inner
products between data points.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose T is a w× n multiplicative perturbation matrix, where w < n. Then,
Case 1 If T iid∼ Nw×n(0, σ2t ), where Nw×n(0, σ2t ) is the zero-mean Gaussian distribution with
variance σ2t =
1
w , then both the inner products and Euclidean distances are preserved in
expectation, i.e., the error u>v− x>y of the inner product produced by random projection
is zero on average, and the variance is inversely proportional to the reduced dimensionality
w. In particular, the variance is at most the inverse of the dimensionality of the reduced
space multiplied by 2 if the original data vectors are normalised to unity [109, Appendix
5.6.1].
Case 2 If T iid∼ Uw×n(0, 1), where U(0, 1) is the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1], then
both the Euclidean distances and inner products between data points are not preserved in
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expectation, i.e., the error u>v− x>y of the inner product produced by uniform transfor-
mation is not zero on average.
Proof. Let tij and εij be the (i, j)-th entry of projection matrix T and T>T respectively. We
consider the two cases in turn:
Case 1 tij ∼ N(0, σ2t ) =⇒ E[t2ij] = σ2t =
1
w . It follows that E[εii] = wσ
2
t = 1, Var[εii] =
2wσ4t =
2
w , ∀i; and E[εij] = 0, Var[εij] = wσ4t =
1
w , ∀i 6= j. Therefore, E[T>T] = I.
Let x, y ∈ Rn. Suppose x and y are projected to u = Tx and v = Ty respectively.
Then,
E[u>v− x>y] = E[x>T>Ty− x>y] = x> E[T>T]y− x>y = 0,
Var[u>v− x>y] = 1
w






In particular, if both x and y are normalised, then (∑i x2i )(∑i y
2
i ) = 1, (∑i xiyi)
2 ≤ 1,








which is inversely proportional to the reduced dimension w. Applying the results
above to vectors u− v and x− y, we have
E
[
(u− v)>(u− v)− (x− y)>(x− y)
]
= 0 =⇒ E
[
‖u− v‖22 − ‖x− y‖22
]
= 0.
If both x and y are normalised, then Var
[
‖u− v‖22 − ‖x− y‖22
]
≤ 32w .
Case 2 tij ∼ U(0, 1) =⇒ E[tij] = 12 , and E[t2ij] =
1











= w E[t2ki] =
w





= ∑wk=1 E[tki]E[tkj] =
w
4 . Therefore,
E[T>T] = [τij], where τij =

w
4 , if i 6= j;
w
3 , if i = j.
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It then follows that
E[u>v− x>y] = E[x>T>Ty− x>y] = x> E[T>T]y− x>y = x>y(E[T>T]− 1) 6= 0.
Hence, both the Euclidean distances and inner products between data points are
not preserved.
Proposition 4.1 shows that a normally distributed RP matrix preserves both Euclidean
distances and inner products in expectation, hence it is beneficial for data analytics such
as clustering and classification. In terms of resistance to different attacks, at the first stage,
we rely on a nonlinear function to resist MAP estimation attack, and at the second stage,
we use random projection to map the transformed data to a low-dimensional subspace
to resist ICA attacks .
4.2 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we first describe the developed RG+RP scheme, and then discuss its ro-
bustness to MAP estimation attack and ICA attack.
4.2.1 RG+RP Scheme
In the setup phase, each participant ci is given a w× n (w < n) random projection matrix,
denoted T, which is generated i.i.d. from Gaussian distribution N(0, 1/w). Suppose
participant ci is contributing data Xi ∈ Rn×mi to the cloud service S for deep learning.
The participant transforms Xi to Zi ∈ Rw×mi in two stages:
Stage 1: The participant transforms Xi to Yi, by applying the nonlinear perturbation
function N element-wise:
Yi = N(Xi). (4.2)
N is chosen to be the repeated Gompertz function, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Stage 2: Using the random projection matrix T initialized in the setup phase, the
participant transforms Yi to Zi as follows:
Zi = TYi. (4.3)
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The participant then sends Zi to the cloud service S . Once S receives all the perturbed
datasets Zi, i = 1, . . . , q, it concatenates them as: Zall = [Z1| · · · |Zq], then builds a deep
learning model on Zall. The pseudocode for the collaborative deep learning procedure is
presented in Algorithm 4.1. The recognition results can be used by end-users for further
analysis or to provide valuable feedback to the participants.
Algorithm 4.1 The collaborative deep learning procedure
Step: Participant
T← a w× n random projection matrix generated from Gaussian distribution N(0, 1/w)
Zi ← T(N(Xi))
Send Zi to the cloud service
Step: Cloud service
Receives Zi, i = 1, . . . , q
Zall ←
[
Z1|Z2| · · · |Zq
]
Build deep learning model on Zall
Send recognition results to the end-users
Step: End-user
Receive recognition results from the cloud service
4.2.2 Privacy Evaluation
This section presents the simulation and evaluation results of RG+RP in terms of its re-
covery resistance. Since RG+RP is inherently resistant to ICA attack, the empirical experi-
ments focus on the recovery rates of MAP estimation attack against RG+RP, and compare
with prior work, i.e., [80], [85] and [83]. Experiments are conducted on both synthetic and
real datasets shown in Table 4.1.
In order to evaluate the recovery resistance of RG+RP against MAP estimation attack,
experimental results are provided in terms of the ε-recovery rate defined in Eq. (3.5). We
estimate the ε-recovery rate as the fraction of test data that can be recovered to within a
relative error of ε.
MAP estimation attack is simulated in the same way as in Sect. 3.3.1. The schemes
shown in Table 4.2 are evaluated in the worst-case scenario where the attacker knows
exactly the victim’s perturbation matrix. The results for different datasets are as follows.
Purely Gaussian datasets: For Gaussian datasets, Figure 4.1 (a) shows that RG+RP
provides significantly higher recovery resistance for both normal and anomalous data
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Table 4.1: Datasets for evaluating recovery resistance.
Datasets #Records(m) Upspace dimension (n) Downspace dimension (w)
Purely Gaussian 5000 15 8
Purely Laplace 5000 15 8
Abalone 4177 8 4
Forest 581012 54 27
Adult 48842 123 62
Gas 13910 128 64
OAR 77597 110 55
DSA 7500 315 158
HAR 7352 561 281
Smiley 20000 20 10
GME 101000 100 50
Table 4.2: Evaluated schemes.
Scheme Nonlinear perturbation function
(stage 1)
Linear projection matrix (stage 2)
RP [80] none T ∼ Nw×n(0, 4)
tanh+RP tanh [85] T ∼ Nw×n(0, 1)
DL+RT [83] double logistic T ∼ Uw×n(0, 1)
RG+RP [38] repeated Gompertz T ∼ Nw×n(0, 1/w)















































































































































































































Figure 4.1: Recovery rates of MAP estimation attack against evaluated schemes, on w×
1000 data projected from 15 × 1000 normalised Gaussian-distributed data (zero mean,
identity covariance matrix) and Laplace-distributed data (zero mean, unity scale).
compared to the other schemes, except for the 0.2-recovery rate for the anomalous data
case, which is slightly less effective than RP. An intuitive explanation for why RP excels
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Datasets








































Figure 4.2: 0.1-recovery rates of MAP estimation attack against the evaluated schemes,
on various datasets. The rank of the perturbation matrix, w = b(n + 1)/2c, where n is
the number of features. Note zero recovery rates in many cases.
at protecting anomalous data is that RP has the effect of “normalising” anomalous data
in the range space of T.
Purely Laplace datasets: Figure 4.1 (b) demonstrates that RG+RP significantly out-
performs other methods for Laplace datasets, and it is especially evident for normal data,
except for the 0.2-recovery rate for the anomalous data case, which is slightly less effective
than tanh+RP. Furthermore, the 0.1-recovery rate against RG+RP is below 10%, which is
significantly lower than other schemes.
Assorted real and synthetic datasets: Consistent with the results for purely Gaussian
and purely Laplace datasets, as shown in Figure 4.2, RG+RP also outperforms tanh+RP
and DL+RT in terms of recovery resistance for both normal data and anomalous data. It
delivers low recovery rates in many cases, especially for DSA and HAR datasets, RG+RP
achieves (0.1, 0)-recovery resistance.
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4.3 Utility Analysis
For utility analysis, we apply different models to both original and perturbed HAR and
MH datasets to study the effect of the privacy-preserving scheme. Moreover, we experi-
mentally compare the proposed LSTM-CNN model with three baseline models in terms
of recognition accuracy.
4.3.1 LSTM-CNN Model
In deep learning models, CNNs and LSTMs are complementary in their modeling capa-
bilities, as CNNs aim at reducing frequency variations, while LSTMs are especially good
for temporal modeling. It is explored in [110] that RNNs outperform CNNs significantly
on activities that are short in duration but have a natural ordering, however, CNNs are
more suitable for prolonged and repetitive activities like walking or running. Therefore,
it would be beneficial to exploit the synergy of CNNs and LSTMs by combining them
into one unified architecture and train them jointly. In our architecture, we leverage the
local and dense property from convolution operation and learn the temporal structure by
storing information in LSTM units, a CNN layer is put above LSTM layer, as illustrated
in Figure 4.3. First, the input features are fed into LSTM layers to reduce temporal varia-
tion. At each time step, the LSTM is capable of combining the previous information with
the current input. Afterwards, we concatenate these outputs to a matrix A ∈ Rk×s, where
s denotes the number of time steps and k denotes the number of features.
Motivated by Blunsom et al. [111], we introduce convolutional layers applying one-
dimensional filters across each column of time signals on the matrix A ∈ Rk×s. We believe
convolving the same filter can extract the dominant information over s consecutive time
signals. In order to capture different positional information, multiple filters with varying
size are utilized. Each convolution operation involves a filter w ∈ Rk×m, which is applied
to a window of m columns to produce a new feature. For example, a feature ci can be
generated from Eq. (4.4):
ci = ReLU(〈w, Ai:i+m−1〉+ b), (4.4)
where
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• ReLU is the Rectified Linear Unit activation function;
• Ai:i+m−1 refers to {xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+m−1}, for xi ∈ Rk, i = {1, . . . , s−m + 1};
• 〈A, B〉 denotes the Frobenius inner product of A and B;
• b ∈ R is a bias term.
Accordingly, for each filter, we can obtain a sequence of features: c1, c2, . . . , cs−m+1.
Like other CNN structures, the convolutional layer is followed by a maxpooling layer,
which aims at capturing the most crucial features in a specific feature mapping, as indi-
cated in Eq. (4.5):
cmax = max(c1, c2, . . . , cs−m+1). (4.5)
Once we obtain all predominant features from CNN, multi-layer perceptron (MLP) can
be used to conduct activity classification.
Figure 4.3: LSTM-CNN architecture. The bottom layer is a RNN nets with 6 time steps. At
convolutional layer, we have 4 unigram filters, and 3 bigram filters and 2 trigram filters.
Then maxpooling layer concatenates all maximum features of feature maps. Finally these
features are fed into a MLP to perform activity classification.
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4.3.2 Wearable Datasets
The initial accuracy evaluation of the proposed scheme is based on two real-world wear-
able datasets from the UCI Machine Learning Repository. The first wearable dataset is
Human Activity Recognition database [103], which consists of recordings of 30 subjects
performing activities of daily living (ADL). Each person performed six activities by wear-
ing a waist-mounted smartphone (Samsung Galaxy S II) with embedded inertial sensors.
From the embedded accelerometer and gyroscope, 3-axial linear acceleration and 3-axial
angular velocity were captured at a constant rate of 50Hz. The labels were recorded by
video. The sensor signals were pre-processed by applying noise filters and then sampled
in fixed-width sliding windows of 2.56 sec and 50% overlap (128 readings/window).
From each window, a vector of 561 features was obtained by calculating variables from
the time and frequency domain.
Another wearable dataset is the Mobile Health (MH) dataset [112], which comprises
body motion and vital signs recordings for ten volunteers while performing 12 common
activities. Sensors placed on the subject’s chest, right wrist and left ankle were used
to measure the motion experienced by diverse body parts, namely, acceleration, rate of
turn and magnetic field orientation. The sensor positioned on the chest also provides
2-lead ECG measurements, which can be potentially used for basic heart monitoring,
checking for various arrhythmias or looking at the effects of exercise on the ECG. All
sensing modalities were recorded using a video camera at a sampling rate of 50 Hz, and
sampled in fixed-width sliding windows of 128 readings/window.
Both HAR dataset and MH dataset have been randomly partitioned into three sets,
70% training data, 15% validation data and 15% test data. We choose the epoch that
delivers the best validation set performance for testing purpose.
4.3.3 Model Evaluation
For accuracy evaluation, we first establish baseline models, namely CNN, LSTM and
DBN. The recognition accuracy for the raw data and RG+RP perturbed data are referred
to as Raw and Perturbed respectively. The corresponding accuracy results for HAR and
MH datasets are shown in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Comparing the proposed LSTM-CNN model with three baseline models in




Raw Perturbed Raw Perturbed
CNN 0.9225 0.9033 0.8399 0.8068
LSTM 0.9134 0.8048 0.8233 0.7996
DBN 0.9536 0.8455 0.8815 0.8237
LSTM-CNN 0.9844 0.9375 0.9556 0.9208
Table 4.4: Accuracy of the proposed LSTM-CNN for HAR dataset under different hyper-




Input Features 9 9 9 9
Hidden Units for LSTM 18/28 18/28 18/28 18/28
Layers for LSTM 1 2 1 2
CPU time per Mini-Batch 38s/40s 79s/85s 20s/25s 48s/53s
Filters for CNN (30, 5), (40, 10), (50, 15), (60, 20)
Accuracy 0.970/0.984 0.980/0.988 0.931/0.937 0.933/0.938
For HAR dataset, we find that the LSTM-CNN architecture provides a 7.77% relative
improvement over the LSTM, 6.71% relative improvement over the CNN, and 3.23% rel-
ative improvement over the DBN. We also notice that the proposed privacy-preserving
RG+RP mechanism achieves 93.75% accuracy, which lowers the accuracy by only 4.76%
compared to the result from the raw data, and is even higher than the accuracy delivered
by the LSTM and CNN models trained on the raw data.
For MH dataset, the LSTM-CNN architecture exhibits a similar accuracy trend, deliv-
ering an accuracy higher than 92% for both the raw data and perturbed data. Considering
the significant privacy benefits provided by our architecture, the accuracy is competitive.
A plausible explanation for the comparable accuracy is that RP has negligible impact
on accuracy degradation, and RG is designed to be nearly consistent in trend with the
original data, thus causing small performance degradation. In addition, unlike simple
linear projections, which can’t capture intrinsic nonlinearities due to limited represen-
tational power, we hypothesize that non-linear projections make data closer to linearly
separable and thus easier to classify. Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 show the results of varying
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Table 4.5: Accuracy of the proposed LSTM-CNN for MH dataset under different hyper-




Input Features 21 21 21 21
Hidden Units for LSTM 28/64 28/64 28/64 28/64
Layers for LSTM 1 2 1 2
CPU time per Mini-Batch 39s/43s 84s/90s 28s/31s 52s/59s
Filters for CNN (30, 5), (40, 10), (50, 15), (60, 20)
Accuracy 0.950/0.955 0.958/0.962 0.915/0.920 0.918/0.921
LSTM depth. Deeper models outperform shallower ones by a small margin at the cost
of doubling the training time. Similarly, larger hidden units do not significantly improve
accuracy.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we consider the scenario where a centralized server performs deep learn-
ing on the collected data contributed by a large number of participants. To remove the
deterrents for users to share their data and benefit from the community knowledge dis-
covery afforded by PS/MCS, service providers need privacy-preserving algorithms that
deliver a reasonable trade-off between data privacy and utility. Hence the problem we are
addressing is how a data owner can release its data with the guarantees that the original sensitive
information cannot be reidentified while the analytic properties of the data are preserved. For a
deep learning approach, we apply LSTM-CNN to human activity recognition from wear-
able sensor data. Compared with traditional DBN models and standalone LSTM, CNN
models, our analysis explicitly demonstrates the competitive performance of LSTM-CNN
in dealing with time-series data. For privacy preservation, we propose a revised two-
stage scheme called RG+RP, where in the first stage, each participant perturbs its data by
passing the data through a nonlinear function called repeated Gompertz (RG); and in the
second stage, each participant’s data is projected to a lower dimension using Gaussian
random projection (RP) matrix to ensure the accuracy of time-series classification, espe-
cially for large data size. The nonlinear function is designed to condition the probability
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density function (pdf) of the perturbed data to thwart maximum a posteriori (MAP) esti-
mation attack, whereas RP compresses the data in a manner that stochastically preserves
the Euclidean distances between pairs of data points as per the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
Lemma to maintain utility and be resistant to ICA attack. For evaluation, we use ε-
recovery rate to assess how much privacy is preserved and how likely users’ private data
can be compromised, and use recognition accuracy to measure the utility of our privacy-
preserving scheme.
Genius is one percent inspiration, ninety-nine percent




Learning in Biomedical Domain
Large-scale models trained on datasets distributed over multiple parties offer clear ad-
vantages over analysis restricted to a single organisation’s homogeneous data source of
limited size. A common case is horizontally-partitioned datasets, wherein each party cu-
rates a separate groups of individual records represented by a feature set common to all
parties. For example, the biomedical domain is experiencing increasing digitisation of
many types of data—demographic, clinical, and genomic—often collected and stored by
independent hospitals or medical research institutions [13].
Privacy implications of sharing such sensitive information as medical data, places
limitations on more widespread use [113]. Even trained models or their predictions can
reveal training data through black-box attacks [14, 58]. Therefore, neither training data
nor derived learned models and predictions can be directly shared with untrusted third
parties, motivating the need for distributed privacy-preserving algorithms [114]. Ex-
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isting state-of-the-art privacy-preserving collaborative frameworks are either based on
computationally intensive techniques e.g., [50] or rely on a central server to distribute
key shares, mediate the modelling process, or aggregate locally trained models [8–10].
Unfortunately server-based frameworks present security and robustness vulnerabilities:
if the central server gets compromised the entire network is under risk of compromise.
To address these limitations it is desirable to remove the centralised server and distribute
computation among the constituent parties.
In this chapter, we consider distributed differential privacy while learning a centroid
classifier, which corresponds to the support vector machine (SVM) in a limiting regulari-
sation regime, and which has demonstrated comparable performance to the SVM on mi-
croarray data [115]. Differentially-private release of SVM classifiers has been previously
considered under the single-party setting [116]. We build a decentralized privacy-preserving
centroid classifier (DPPCC) for horizontally partitioned data. DPPCC distinguishes itself
from existing techniques by making no use of trusted and centralised third party aggre-
gators. We achieve decentralisation and privacy through the use of exponential ElGamal
and differential privacy, and obtain performance competitive with the equivalent non-
private classifier. Using this model we investigate three practical sharing scenarios where
all parties collaborate, without disclosure of their data, to:
1. learn a shared model;
2. produce a prediction for a given sample; and
3. produce a prediction without revealing the sample.
5.1 Distributed Learning Approaches
In general, distributed learning approaches fall into three categories of aggregation:
trusted aggregator, untrusted aggregator, or no aggregator.
Trusted aggregator. Traditional techniques consider a trusted third party who is enti-
tled to see all participants’ data in the clear. The pure differential privacy framework [86]
assumes a centralised data custodian.
Untrusted aggregator. By contrast, an untrusted aggregator is not trusted by any
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parties, hence parties must sufficiently blind shared statistics of input data, such as via
randomisation in guaranteeing Local Differential Privacy (LDP). In the case of additive
noise, aggregation sums up individual noise shares such that the final aggregation only
preserves utility under very large population sizes. To preserve privacy and maintain
utility (especially under the more challenging case of modest data sizes), differential pri-
vacy can be made distributed by combination with cryptographic protocols, as evidenced
by the following schemes.
Rastogi et al.[9] leverage an untrusted aggregator to aggregate sums over multiple
data sources using the Paillier semi-homomorphic encryption scheme. Their proposed
Distributed Laplace Perturbation Algorithm generates Laplace noise using four Gaussian
variables, while our solution is more efficient, by exploiting stability of the simple dis-
crete Gaussian distribution. Furthermore, we remark that their scheme is not resistant
to collusion attacks as malicious users can collude with the aggregator to infer informa-
tion about honest users—implying that the aggregator may not be fully untrusted. In the
pathological case of an untrusted aggregator colluding with the remaining N− 1 parties,
they might try to retrieve a victim party’s data xi by decrypting and subtracting the other
N − 1 parties’ values from the result. A detailed description of flaws in their scheme,
witnessed by specific attacks, is provided in Appendix A.3.
Ács et al.[8] propose a differential-privately summation over smart meter data, over
multiple time slots, where the aggregator is untrusted. Smart meters are grouped into
clusters, where a cluster covers hundreds or thousands of smart meters corresponding to
a quarter of a city and Laplace-perturbed readings are sent to an electricity distributor.
This requires all meters in a cluster to share pairwise keys.
Shi et al.[10] propose distributed differential privacy (DDP) to guarantee (ε, δ)-differential
privacy of the aggregate of time-series data in every time period, where noise is sourced
from multiple participants, and no parties (or the aggregator) should view anything but
the final differentially-private result. They use symmetric geometric distribution as a dis-
crete approximation to the Laplace distribution, where each participant adds noise prob-
abilistically. However, their encryption scheme relies on a trusted dealer allocating q + 1
secrets that sum to 0, to the data aggregator and the q participants; also unfortunately
their construction is not robust against node and communication failures.
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No aggregator. In the absence of an aggregator, Dwork et al. [50] first propose a dis-
tributed protocol called “Our Data, Ourselves” to generate shares of random noise, se-
cure against malicious participants. The shares of random binomial noise are generated
by coin flipping, which is secure against malicious participants. However, this requires
communication among users and the expensive secret sharing technique results in O(n)
multiplications and additions in shares, where n denotes the number of participants, thus
not preferable for large number of users.
In this chapter, we propose a purely decentralized aggregation model, which pro-
vides fault tolerance and eliminates the aggregator by distributing noise generation and
aggregation among existing parties.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Centroid Classifier
Let X be an m× d data matrix of m training instances in Rd and Y ∈ Rm be the vector of
corresponding labels in {−1, 1}. The labelled training set right-augmenting X by column
vector Y is denoted by m× (d + 1) matrix D ∈ (Rd × {−1, 1})m.
It is well supported from the perspective of statistical learning theory that regular-
isation can be used to generate robust empirical estimators and classifiers from noisy
data [117–119]. An limiting case of regularisation of SVMs corresponds to the centroid
classifier, where one represents the positive and negative classes by their centroids, and
performs classification based on the distance of an instance to these two centroids. The











where k(·, ·) is a kernel, b is a learned bias term, and −1 ≤ B ≤ 1 is a hyperparameter
representing misclassification cost ratio between the two classes. The feature space is the
projection onto the vector connecting (weighted) arithmetic means of samples from both
class labels, degenerating to the mean of a single class for B = ±1, respectively [115].
For a suitable kernel k, it implements the difference between Parzen window estimates
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of probability densities for both labels. Under the linear kernel, it simplifies to:










where wB ∈ Rn represents the centroid weight vector and x̄y stands for the centroid of the
samples with label y = ±1. If B = 0 and b = wB · (x̄+1 + x̄−1)/2, the decision hyperplane
will lie exactly halfway between x̄+1 and x̄−1. If we weigh each class’s contribution to
costs equally under unbalanced classes, via B = (m+1 − m−1)/m, where m+1 and m−1
are the positive and negative class sizes, m := m+1 + m−1, then this corresponds to van
Rooyen et al.’s unhinged loss function −y f (x) with solution w = XᵀY/m [120].
5.2.2 Distributed Differential Privacy
Dwork et al.[86] first proposed the privacy criterion of differential privacy for the single
database scenario, where for every query, a privacy-preserving mechanism randomises
the response to the query. For the scenario where data are sourced from multiple parties
who do not trust the aggregator or without any aggregator, a distributed version of dif-
ferential privacy—distributed differential drivacy (DDP)—is needed [8–10,50]. DDP reflects
the fact that the noise in the target statistic is sourced from multiple parties for guarantee-
ing differential privacy of the final result, while also guaranteeing that no intermediate
(non-private) computations are observed by the collaborating parties.
Shi et al. [10] first defined DDP for the scenario where a single aggregator evaluates
an aggregation function; we reformulate DDP for decentralized aggregation.
Each participant i possesses a share of data xi ∈ Rd. If honest, the participant ob-
tains random bits ri ∈ {0, 1}q, which together with its data, it maps to randomised
statistic x̂i via function fi. All parties collaborate with intended goal to evaluate some
χ : (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) 7→ s such that the composition χ ◦ ( f1, . . . , fn) = M some desired ran-
domised mechanism mapping database D ∈ Dn to response spaceR.
Given a subset K of parties, we let rK := {ri : i ∈ K} and denote K̄ be the complement
of K, i.e., K̄ = {1, 2, ..., n} \ K.
Two databases D, D′ are said to be neighbours or neighbouring databases if they differ
in exactly one record. This corresponds to one party changing a record.
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Definition 5.1 (Distributed DP). Let ε > 0, 0 ≤ δ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1, We say that the mech-
anism M as described above, with randomness over the joint distribution of r := (r1, · · · , rn)
preserves (ε, δ, γ)-distributed differential privacy (DDP), if the following conditions hold. (1)
For any neighbouring databases D, D′ ∈ Dn that differ in one record, for any measurable S ⊆ R










That is if a sufficient number of parties the mechanism completes with a release s ∈ R that
preserves approximate DP. (2) No party, irrespective of whether it is honest or not, can learn
anything about any other party’s data share except via the final release s ∈ R—semantically
secure collaboration χ.
When K is the set of compromised parties, the above definition requires that the re-
maining honest parties’ randomness be sufficient to ensure differential privacy. There-
fore, the probability is conditioned on the randomness rK from compromised parties. In
other words, the probability is taken over the randomness rK̄ from honest parties. The
definition of DDP requires smoothness to hold over any set K̄ of uncompromised par-
ties, for |K̄| ≥ γn. For differentially-private aggregation of local statistics, DDP permits
each individual to randomise its local statistic to a lesser degree than would local differ-
ential privacy. Provided the final randomised release byM has accumulated sufficient
randomness, each individual’s privacy is guaranteed.
Approaches to DDP that implement an overall additive noise mechanism by sum-
ming the same mechanism run at each party (typically with less noise) necessitates mech-
anisms with stable distributions—to guarantee proper calibration of known end-to-end
response distribution—and cryptography for hiding all but the final result from partici-
pating parties [8–10, 50].
5.2.3 Distributed Exponential ElGamal Cryptosystem
As the released randomised plain text space for each party is expected to be small, namely
the weight vector that depends on the number of features or only a scalar test result, we
employ exponential ElGamal [64]. Instead of encrypting m in the traditional ElGamal,
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ElGamal is used in an additive manner here by encrypting gm, here g ∈ Gq is an arbitrary,
publicly known element that generates the public key. The difficulty in decryption lies in
the computation of discrete logarithms, as running the standard decryption only yields
gm, and recovering m requires solution of the discrete log. However, as long as m is small,
this can be solved either algorithmically, or through a pre-computed lookup table. It has
been shown that ElGamal is semantically secure, i.e., it is computationally infeasible to
distinguish between the encryptions of any pair of the given messages, provided that the
decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable [121]. This makes the scheme perfectly
suited to DDP. The procedure for Exponential ElGamal can be illustrated as follows:
1. Key generation: Let p and q be large primes so that q divides p − 1. Let g be a
generator of Gq, which is a multiplicative subgroup of Zp∗ of order q. The private
key is x ∈ Zq; the public key is h = gx.
2. Encryption: A plaintext m ∈ Gq is mapped onto an element gm of G. gm is en-
crypted by computing the following ciphertext tuple where r ∈ Zq is an arbitrary
random number chosen by the encrypter:
(c1, c2) = (gr, gmhr)
3. Decryption: gm is decrypted by computing:
c2 · c−x1 = g
mhr · g−xr = gm
In the distributed exponential ElGamal cryptosystem, key generation is distributed
among n parties. Each party independently generates a standard key pair based on the
public parameters, namely the group description (G, q, g, p) where: p is prime, G is a
cyclic group of order q, and g is a generator of the group. All computations in the re-
mainder of this chapter are modulo p unless otherwise noted. To achieve sharing, each
party publishes its public key, then combines all the public keys to form a single joint
public key. Anything encrypted with the joint public key can only be decrypted if all
the participating parties each perform a partial decryption using the corresponding se-
cret key. Those partial decryptions can be publicly shared and the final decryption can
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be performed publicly—-assuming the final result could be public, otherwise it should
be done privately. Our proposed distributed exponential ElGamal encryption consists
of four components: distributed key generation, encryption, partial decryption and fi-
nal decryption. The detailed procedure for parties Alice, Bob and Lily is described in
Algorithm 5.1.
Algorithm 5.1 Distributed exponential ElGamal encryption
Distributed key generation
1: Alice, Bob and Lily generate an efficient description of a cyclic group G of order q, with
generator g.
2: Alice, Bob and Lily select their private key shares xi ∈ Zq∗, which falls into {1, . . . , q− 1}.
3: Alice, Bob and Lily individually compute hi = gxi , along with the description of (G, q, g, p)
as their public keys, which are published to other parties. Each party keeps xi as its private key,
which must be kept secret.
4: Alice, Bob and Lily receive public key hi from each other, the key pair of the cryptosystem
corresponds to:
joint public key: h = h1 · h2 · h3=gx1+x2+x3
secret key: x = ∑3i=1xi.
Encryption
1: Each party encrypts its message mi (in case 1, mi = ŵi, and in case 2 and case 3, mi = ŷi, here
ˆmeans DP perturbed version, see Section 5.4.4) under the joint public key (G, q, g, p, h).
2: Each party chooses a random r from Zq, then calculates c1 := gr.
3: Each party maps secret message mi onto an element m′i in G by computing mi
′ = gmi .
4: Each party encrypts mi ′ with the joint public key as c2 := mi ′ · hr.
5: Each party sends ciphertext (c1, c2) = (gr, mi ′ · hr) to other parties.
6: Once one party receives encryptions from other parties, it combines all the encryptions as
(c1, c2) = (gr, m′ · hr), where m′ = gm (in case 1, m = ŵ1 + ŵ2 + ŵ3, and in case 2 and case 3,
m = ŷ1 + ŷ2 + ŷ3).
Partial decryption
1: Each party uses its secret key to compute the corresponding partial decryption of m′ and
forwards it back to other parties.
Final decryption
1: Denote each party’s shared secret as si := c
xi
1 , after combing all parties’ shared secrets, s :=
cx1+x2+x31 . The requested party completes final decryption by computing c2 · s−1 = m′ · hr ·
c−(x1+x2+x3)1 = m
′ · g(x1+x2+x3)r · g−r(x1+x2+x3) = m′ where s−1 is the inverse of s in the group
G.
2: m′ is reverted back into the plaintext message m using look up table.
With this setting, all shares xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of the secret keys are needed to decrypt
any ciphertext, and no individual party is able to decrypt any ciphertext on their own.
Notice that the message space {0, · · · , p − 1} is quite large compared with the look up
table (LUT) range, so we first wrap with coin flipping with the sign kept by choosing
a large prime p—which is preferred to be larger than the original message space to en-
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sure utility—then distinguish or recover the original message after decryption. During
final decryption, everyone checks whether their exponential sum (exponential form of
the aggregated weight vector or test result) can be decoded, if the exponential sum of
one feature cannot be decoded (overflow the LUT), we can just abandon this feature. No
need to restart the protocol because it could pose privacy leakage if one party deliberately
adds more noise to overflow the LUT. If this happens, random projection can be used to
analyse the impact of the abandoned feature on utility.
5.3 Problem Setup
We focus on training data comprising m training examples stacked as a matrix X ∈ Rm×d
on d features and associated labels Y ∈ Rm. The dataset is partitioned into n disjoint
subsets (Xi, Yi) for i ∈ [n] representing n parties each curating their own part of the data
over a common d-dimensional feature space. The goal of the honest majority of parties
is to cooperate to train a joint centroid classifier on this distributed dataset to high utility.
In particular we seek no utility loss due to decentralisation. To achieve this goal, each
party individually trains local centroid classifiers on their own subset of data. A more
accurate global model f (X) = w can be released by aggregating the parameters of all the
local models f (Xi) = wi. Similarly, the prediction on any test record x can be given by
querying the prediction API kept by all the participating parties, which equals the sum of
predictions from all the subsets and approximates the result from the combined training
set f (x, X).
To achieve strong privacy guarantees, we assume that fewer than 1 − γ = 1/3 of
participants are adversarial—the rest are assumed to be honest. A global statistic may
be released at a pre-determined level of (ε, δ)-differential privacy on the entire dataset;
but any other raw or derived local statistic not at this level of DP must be encrypted as
required by (ε, δ, γ)-distributed differential privacy. Remark: [Integrity and availability]
Integrity and availability are not our primary goals, however we seek solutions to prevent
the most advantageous availability attack whereby one party prevents the others from
decoding the response while themself observing the response.
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5.4 DPPCC Protocol
In our protocol, we assume that at least a fraction of parties (e.g., 2/3) are honest, while
the remaining parties are either honest or malicious. The noise generation task is dis-
tributed among the honest parties, who jointly contribute randomness to ensure differ-
ential privacy of the global statistic, i.e., aggregated parameters or predictions. Each party
may add less noise, and as long as the noise in the global statistic meets the required level,
the privacy of the global statistic can be guaranteed. For example, consider the case of
sharing weight vectors of individually trained models, i.e., a query function that returns
a weight vector wi = f (Xi) given data Xi. Then the goal is to release a differentially-
private global statistic, i.e., noisy sum ∑i f (Xi) + r, which should be close to the desired
global statistic ∑i f (Xi), and where r is the required noise to guarantee (ε, δ)-differential
privacy of the global statistic by following Corollary A.2.
However, for our DPPCC protocol, DP alone is not enough to guarantee privacy of
local statistics, as only the global statistic is differentially private. Meanwhile, local differ-
ential privacy ensures a stronger higher level of privacy at the cost of utility. To preserve
privacy and maintain utility, we seek distributed differential privacy leveraging the dis-
tributed exponential ElGamal cryptosystem, where the local statistics are encrypted us-
ing exponential ElGamal such that each party can only partially decrypt the sum of all
the locally released statistics, but cannot access any of them individually.
5.4.1 The Gaussian Mechanism for (ε, δ)-DP
We recall the Gaussian mechanism [22] for achieving approximate differential privacy
(DDP with a single honest party), with a new analysis leading to privacy guarantees
over a wider range of privacy parameters. Namely we remove the constraint ε < 1. A
detailed explanation and proof is deferred to the supplementary material.
Corollary 5.1. Adding i.i.d. zero mean and variance σ2 Gaussian noise to a vector valued statis-
tic on D ∈ Dn achieves (ε, δ)-DP if σ ≥ ∆2 f (
√
2ε+Φ−2(δ/2)−Φ−1(δ/2))
2ε , where ∆2 f denotes the
L2 sensitivity of the query function f , and Φ is the Gaussian cumulative distribution function
(CDF).
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5.4.2 Discrete Gaussian Distribution
As the plaintext in our cryptosystem must be discrete, we require discrete noise. Hence-
forth, the discrete Gaussian distribution is introduced in Definition A.1.
Definition 5.2 (Discrete Gaussian). The pmf of the discrete Gaussian is proportional to the pdf
of its continuous version. For any x ∈ Z, it is defined as:











Our motivation for remaining with the discrete Gaussian distribution is that it is a
stable distribution like its continuous version (a sum of discrete Gaussian r.v.’s is still dis-
crete Gaussian), and so will be ideal for realising distributed differential privacy: analysis
of overall privacy is made possible by analysing individuals, while also supporting fault
tolerance if some individuals are compromised.
Corollary 5.2 (Stability of disc. Gaus.). The sum of independent discrete Gaussian distributed
random variables is discrete Gaussian.
The corresponding proof for the stability of discrete Gaussian distribution is provided
in the supplementary material.
5.4.3 Plaintext Discretisation
Like most cryptographic techniques, our adopted scheme requires plaintext in a integer-
valued discrete group. We therefore propose a Scaling, Rounding, Unscaling (SRU) Algo-
rithm 5.2 to scale and round the locally computed floating-point statistics.
Algorithm 5.2 Scaling, Rounding, Unscaling (SRU)
Input: scaling factor s, scalar x
Scaling (S) is achieved by multiplying by scaling factor s: x 7→ sx.
Rounding (R) converts the scaled real value to the nearest integer for encryption: sx 7→ bsxe.
Unscaling (U) divides the scaled and rounded scalar by the same scaling factor s: bsxe 7→ bsxes .
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5.4.4 Release Scenarios
Case 1: Sharing Model Parameter
In case 1, each party trains a local model on its own training data, and forms the global
model for release by summing over local model parameters. Figure 5.1 depicts the DP-
PCC framework for case 1, where each party adds noise ri to its local model parame-
ters wi before encryption, then the encrypted noisy model parameters E(ŵi) are shared
among all the parties. The detailed procedure appears in Algorithm 5.3.
Algorithm 5.3 DPPCC protocol for case 1
1: Training local model: Each party calculates its weight vector wi = f (Xi) based on local
training data Xi.
2: Scaling: Each party multiplies wi by a specified scaling factor s agreed on by all parties to
reduce the effect of rounding on loss, such as s = 103, S(wi) = wi ∗ s.
3: Rounding: Each party rounds the scaled floating-point S(wi) to integers as SR(wi) =
R(S(wi)).
4: Adding noise: Each party adds the scaled discrete Gaussian noise to its scaled and rounded
weight vector as A = SR(wi) + SR(ri).
5: Encryption: Each party shares the encrypted E(A, pk) with other parties by encrypting A
with the joint public key pk.
6: Partial decryption: After each party receives the encrypted noisy weight vectors from other
parties, it partially decrypts the sum, then sends the partial decryption back to other parties.
7: Final decryption and unscaling: Once each party receives all the partial decryption from all
parties, it adds them together as the global weight vector, then divides by s.
For DPPCC in case 1, the released statistic of f is a weight vector, namely, f (X) = w.
Assume each item xik of the whole database X is bounded by ∆, then the range of each
element of the released w is also bounded by ∆, as stated in Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1. (Query range in case 1). If each item xik of the whole database X is bounded by
[−∆, ∆], then each item wk of the non-private query result f (X) = w is bounded by [−∆, ∆].
Proof. If each item xik of the whole database X is bounded by [−∆, ∆], i.e., |xik| ≤ ∆ for
any i ∈ {1, ..., m} and k ∈ {1, ..., d}, then the L1 and L2 norm of each row vector xi of the
whole database X are bounded by:
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Figure 5.1: DPPCC for case 1.



























































Case 2: Sharing Predictions on Non-Sensitive Test Data
In case 2, an end user sends their test instance to all parties through a secure communi-
cation channel. Local models have been trained by each party based on its local training
data. Instead of sharing the locally trained weight vectors, local test results are privately
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shared among all the parties, who add all the test results together as the global test result,
which is sent back to the end user. Figure 5.2 illustrates the DPPCC for case 2, procedures
are detailed in Algorithm 5.4.
Figure 5.2: DPPCC for case 2.
Algorithm 5.4 DPPCC protocol for case 2
1: Training local model: Each party calculates local weight vector wi = f (Xi) based on local
training data Xi.
2: Sending test data: For each test record xi sent by the end user to all parties via secure chan-
nels, each party computes local test result yi.
3: Scaling: Multiply yi by a specified scaling factor s agreed on by all parties to reduce the effect
of rounding on loss, such as s = 103, S(yi) = yi ∗ s;
4: Rounding: Round the scaled floating-point S(yi) to integer as SR(yi) = R(S(yi));
5: Adding noise to test result: Each party adds Gaussian noise ri to its local test result as A =
SR(yi) + SR(ri).
6: Encryption: Each party encrypts noisy test result with the joint public key pk as E(A, pk) and
shares it with other parties.
7: Partial decryption: After each party sums over the received encrypted noisy test results from
all parties, it partially decrypts the sum, and sends the partial decryption back to other parties.
8: Final decryption and unscaling: The requested party adds all the received partial decryption
together as the global test result, followed by dividing by s, and sending it back to the end
user.
Case 3: Sharing Predictions on Sensitive Test Data
Similar to case 2, case 3 also shares the test results, rather than the weight vector. Hence
the analysis for sensitivity is similar to case 2. The only difference lies in whether the test
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data from end user is sensitive. For highly sensitive data, the end user would prefer to
first flip its test data randomly, then distribute its encrypted test data to all parties. The
noise addition procedure is the same as in case 2, except that the end user takes part in
the encryption and decryption. In particular, the end user generates a key pair, encrypts
its flipped and scaled test data with public key, and broadcasts the encrypted test data
and public key to all parties. Each party in the decentralized system first multiples the en-
crypted test data with its local model parameters to get local encrypted prediction, which
follows from the MultiByScalar property of any additive homomorphic encryption, for
example, the exponential ElGamal. Each party then adds the encrypted local prediction
with the scaled discrete Gaussian noise encrypted with the public key of end user, finally
shares the encrypted noisy local prediction with other parties. In the second round of
communication, each party runs a consensus protocol to ensure everyone gets the same
aggregated prediction. After receiving the aggregated prediction from any party, end
user decrypts, unscales and flips it back to get the final prediction. DPPCC for case 3 is
illustrated in Figure 5.3 and elaborated in Algorithm 5.5.
Figure 5.3: DPPCC for case 3.
Theorem 5.2. (Query range in cases 2 and 3). If each item xik of the whole database X is bounded
by [−∆, ∆], then the non-private query result y = f (x, X) = x ∗w = x ∗∑ni=1 wi = ∑ni=1 yi is
bounded by [−d∆2, d∆2].
Proof. If each item of the whole database X is bounded by [−∆, ∆], then each item of the
test record is also bounded by [−∆, ∆], i.e., |xk| ≤ ∆ for any k ∈ {1, ..., d}, then the bound
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Algorithm 5.5 DPPCC protocol for case 3
1: Training local model: Each party trains local weight vector wi = f (Xi) based on local training
data Xi.
2: End user sends encrypted flipped test record: End user flips its test record randomly be-
fore forwarding it to all parties, then scales and rounds its flipped test record, followed by
encrypting with its public key.
3: Encrypted local prediction: Each party multiples the encrypted test data with its local model
parameters to get encrypted local prediction.
4: Adding noise: Each party adds the encrypted local prediction with the discrete Gaussian
noise that is scaled and encrypted with the public key of end user.
5: Aggregation and consensus: Each party adds all the encrypted noisy local predictions as the
aggregated prediction, runs a consensus protocol.
6: Final decryption: Once end user receives the aggregated prediction from any party, it de-
crypts, unscales and flips it back to the final prediction.
for the scalar query result becomes:
|y| =| f (x, X)| = |∑dk=1 xk ∗ wk| ≤ ∆ ∑dk=1 |wk|
By Theorem 5.1, |wk| ≤ ∆, therefore, |y| ≤ d∆2.
5.5 Theoretical Analysis
5.5.1 Scaling-Rounding-Unscaling (SRU) Loss
Theorem 5.3. (SRU loss for scalar x). For a specific scaling factor s and any scalar x ∈ R, the
loss of SRU algorithm is upper-bounded by 12s .
Proof. For any scalar x ∈ R and scaling factor s ∈ R+, the loss can be expressed as:
|x− bsxes | = |
sx−bsxe
s |. From the definition of rounding to the nearest integer b.e, we know





Since scaling/rounding and unscaling are separate operations that occur at different
stages, to be specific, scaling and rounding operations are firstly applied to the original
model parameters or test results, while unscaling is applied after the decryption of the
noisy sum of the model parameters or test results is derived, hence we explicitly define
scaling and rounding operations as SR and unscaling operation as U. We denote the total
loss of SRU algorithm as lossSRU . The corresponding analysis for the effect of SRU on
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the global statistic (the sum of the locally released model parameters or test results) is
detailed in Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.1. (SRU loss in case 1). For any weight vector wi ∈ Rd of party i in case 1, the loss of
SRU algorithm is upper-bounded by n
√
d
2s , where n and d represent the number of parties and the
dimension of the released weight vector, s refers to the scaling factor.
Proof. In case 1, each party firstly applies scaling and rounding to its original weight
vector wi ∈ Rd, after aggregation and decryption, the sum of all the scaled and rounded
noisy weight vectors SR(wi) + SR(ri) is unscaled by dividing by the scaling factor s.
Here, ri is the discrete Gaussian noise vector added to party i’s original weight vector wi,
thus SR(wi) needs to add noise SR(ri) = bsrie = sri. Therefore,
lossSRU =
∥∥U (∑ni=1(SR(wi) + SR(ri)))−∑ni=1(wi + ri)∥∥2
=







From Theorem 5.3, for any j ∈ {1, ..., d}, |swij − bswije| ≤ 12 , it then follows∥∥swi − bswie∥∥2 ≤ √d2 , ∥∥∑ni=1(bswie − swi)∥∥2 ≤ n√d2 . Therefore, lossSRU ≤ n√d2s .
Lemma 5.2. (SRU loss in case 2). For any test result yi ∈ R of party i in case 2, the loss of SRU
algorithm is upper-bounded by n2s , where n and s represent the number of parties and scaling
factor respectively.
Proof. In case 2, each party firstly applies scaling and rounding operations to its original
test result yi ∈ R, after aggregation and decryption, the sum of all the scaled and rounded
noisy test results SR(yi) + SR(ri) is unscaled by dividing by the scaling factor s. Here, ri
corresponds to the discrete Gaussian noise added to party i’s original test result yi, thus
SR(yi) needs to add noise SR(ri) = bsrie = sri. Therefore,
84 Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning in Biomedical Domain
lossSRU =
∥∥U (∑ni=1(SR(yi) + SR(ri)))−∑ni=1(yi + ri)∥∥2
=







For any yi, from Theorem 5.3, |syi − bsyie| ≤ 12 , it then follows ‖∑
n
i=1(bsyie − syi)‖2 ≤ n2 .
Therefore, lossSRU ≤ n2s .
5.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Case 1 Sensitivity
For a centroid classifier, the detailed analysis of L2 sensitivity for case 1 is elaborated in
Lemma 5.3 for B = 0 and Lemma 5.4 for B = m+1−m−1m , where the total number of records
is m = m+1 + m−1. Changing only jth row of X from xj to x′j results in a new database X
′
with f (X′) = w′, which corresponds to the scenario when exactly one party changes its
data by one row. The effect of changing one row on the associated label can be analysed
by two cases: change of one row with change to label (without loss of generality, assume
the label of the changed row changes from +1 → -1); change of row with no change to
label (assume the changed row with the original label +1 remains +1).
Lemma 5.3. (Case 1 sensitivity bound when B = 0). Suppose each item xik of the whole database
X is bounded by ∆, then when B = 0, L1k sensitivity of each item of the global weight vec-
tor is bounded by ∆( 1m+1−1 +
1
m−1+1





). The maximum L1k and L2 sensitivity correspond to ∆(1 + 1m−1 ) and√
d∆(1 + 1m−1 ) respectively when m+1 takes the boundary points of either 2 or m.
Proof. When B = 0, we consider two cases:
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Following the triangle inequality, L1 and L2 sensitivity are formulated as:
‖ f (X)− f (X′)‖1 =
1
2




‖ f (X)− f (X′)‖2 =
1
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≤ 1
m−1(m−1 + 1)














Therefore, L1k and L2 global sensitivity of the query function f follow:





































f (X)− f (X′) = 1
2m+1
(
xj − xj ′
)























, we take the bound in the worst case, namely higher
bound in scenario 1. To better analyse the sensitivity, we define a specific function as
F = 1m+1−1 +
1
m−m+1+1 , it can be inferred that the function F of m+1 is symmetric with
m
2 + 1, and is monotonically increasing when m+1 ≥
m
2 + 1 and monotonically decreas-
ing when m+1 < m2 + 1, hence it is a convex function with the maximum locating at the
boundary points, namely when m+1 takes either 2 or m.
Lemma 5.4. (Case 1 sensitivity bound when B = m+1−m−1m ). Suppose each item xik of the whole
database X is bounded by ∆, then when B = m+1−m−1m , L1k sensitivity of each item of the global
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Proof. When B = m+1−m−1m , 1 + B =
2m+1
m , 1− B =
2m−1
m , similarly, we consider the follow-
ing two scenarios:
Scenario 1: label is changed
B′ =
(m+1 − 1)− (m−1 + 1)
m
=
m+1 −m−1 − 2
m
1 + B′ =
2(m+1 − 1)
m


















(1 + B′)(∑+xi − xj)
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f (X)− f (X′) = 1
m
(xj + xj ′)


















Scenario 2: label is not changed
B′ = B =
m+1 −m−1
m
1 + B = 1 + B′ =
2m+1
m




























∑+xi − xj + xj ′ −∑−xi
)
f (X)− f (X′) = 1
m
(xj − xj ′)



















Theorem 5.4. For each local model, if the released local weight vector wi := [wi1, ..., wid] has
discrete Gaussian noise added, then the global weight vector w that sums over the noisy local
weight vectors is (ε, δ)-differentially private, provided the added discrete Gaussian noise ri :=
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[ri1, ..., rid] follows the randomisation procedure described in Corollary A.2, where ∆2 f is the L2
sensitivity of f (X) = w.
Case 2 and 3 Sensitivity Analysis
Lemma 5.5. (Case 2 sensitivity bound). Suppose each item xik of the whole database X is bounded








when B = m+1−m−1m , L2 sensitivity of the global test result is bounded by
2d∆2
m .
Proof. Cases 2 and 3 aim to release the test result y for any test record x as f (x, X) = y.
As test result is a scalar, ∆ f = ∆1 f = ∆2 f . According to Theorem 5.1, both each item
wk of w and each item xik of the whole database X are bounded by ∆, therefore, for each
test record x, and training data X and X′ that differ in one record, L1 and L2 sensitivity of
query function f are derived as:
∆2 f = ∆1 f = ‖ f (x, X)− f (x, X′)‖1 = ‖∑dk=1 xk(wk − w′k)‖1
≤ ∑dk=1 ‖xk‖1‖wk − w′k‖1 ≤ ∆ ∑
d
k=1 ‖wk − w′k‖1

















When B = m+1−m−1m , from Lemma 5.4, L1k = ‖wk − w′k‖1 ≤
2∆
m , therefore, it follows:




Theorem 5.5. If the released local test result yi has discrete Gaussian noise added, then the
global test result y that sums over all the noisy local test results is (ε, δ)-differentially private,
provided the added discrete Gaussian noise ri follows the randomisation procedure described in
Corollary A.2, where ∆2 f refers to the L2 sensitivity of f (x, X) = y.
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5.6 Consistency, Fault Tolerance and Availability
5.6.1 Consistency
To prevent dishonest parties sending inconsistent data to honest parties, a consensus
protocol that ensures each party is decrypting the same thing is given in Theorem 5.6.
Theorem 5.6. If honest parties generate noise according to Corollary A.2, then a consensus pro-
tocol on what is being decrypted can tolerate k failures, which is less than 1/3 of the total number
of parties, and the consensus protocol will terminate in k + 1 rounds to guarantee consensus.
5.6.2 Fault Tolerance
The Byzantine faults [122] assume that the participating parties need to agree upon the
aggregated model under the constraint that each party may fail: if a single user does not
respond in the decryption phase, no decryption can be obtained. The Byzantine Generals
Problem is solvable only if more than two-thirds of the generals are honest, so a single
traitor can confound two honest generals. In particular, with only three generals, no
solution exists in the presence of a single traitor. We provide a decentralized interactive
solution by removing the trusted server under the assumption that strictly less than one
third of the parties are malicious. Specifically, the following solutions can be applied:
(i) (t, n)-threshold decryption [123] scheme which requires the cooperation of at least t
parties for decryption, if k users fail to send their decryption shares, the (t, n)-threshold
property ensures that a decryption can still be computed as long as k < n − t. The
threshold ElGamal cryptosystem can tolerate the passive corruption of k < n/3 parties.
(ii) during the noise addition process, each party i perturb f (xi) by sampling from a
Gaussian with mean zero and variance 32 σ/n, where σ is the lower bound of the noise
in Corollary A.2. Afterwards, the perturbed values are shared and summed, yielding
∑i f (xi) + r. Since we assume that at least 2/3 of the participants will survive, the total
amount of noise would be sufficient, but not excessive.
In the above solution, we are concerned about failures of parties that occur between
encryption and final decryption in our protocol. Failures that happen before or after it do
not affect the utility of our protocol. Since execution of our protocol takes less than a few
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seconds in practice, failures within this small time window are rare and of small size.
5.6.3 Availability
To guarantee the availability of our protocol, no matter when the malicious party
drops out, after the first round of communication, all participating parties should check
whether their aggregated values are the same. If all the participating parties hold the
same value, then the second round of communication will be started; otherwise, rolling
back to the first round of communication.
Decoding Availability
As a result of our use of exponential ElGamal to achieve additive homomorphism, it is
necessary to construct a decoding table to solve the discrete log of the encoded plaintext.
Constructing such a table is only feasible if the size of the table required is small, in re-
lation to the size of the message space. In an honest run of our protocol the size of the
table can be predicted and will be within reasonable bounds. However, in a malicious
setting there is the potential for an adversary to perform an availability attack by apply-
ing a large amount of noise to their value to force the aggregated value outside the range
that can be decoded by the constructed table. This results in a successful availability at-
tack, since the honest participants cannot recover the plaintext. Additionally, the attacker
would gain a further advantage since they would know the size of the shift and construct
their own shifted table to decode the value and remove the additional noise to recover
the genuine result. It should be noted that such an attack does not impact on privacy,
since the aggregated result is still differentially private.
The solution is to blind the aggregated value prior to decryption. This allows all
parties to establish whether the plaintext will be decodable, without revealing the actual
plaintext to any adversary. Each party would select at random a blinding factor BF from
a suitable range—determined by the size of the constructed table and expected range of
aggregate values. BF must be large enough to render a blinded aggregated value useless,
but small enough that the sum of the BF from all parties and the aggregate value is
within the range that is decodable by the look up table. Each party encrypts their BF as
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E(BF, pk) and shares it with the other parties. The sum of the BF’s is homomorphically
added to the aggregated value and the decryption protocol followed. If the decrypted
value is not decodable, i.e., lies outside the lookup table, that repective aggregated value
is discarded. If, however, the decrypted value is decodable—by virtue of being in the
lookup table—the parties would jointly decrypt the sum of just the BF’s, look it up in the
lookup table—and subtract the plaintext from the decrypted aggregated value, giving
the unblinded aggregated value.
5.7 Performance Evaluation
5.7.1 Baseline Models
Since DPPCC distributes noise among all parties and ensures (ε, δ)-differential privacy for
the aggregated global statistic, we refer to it here as a global private centroid classifier. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed DPPCC by comparison with the following
three baseline models.
Local private centroid classifier excludes cryptosystem as each party adds enough
noise to locally released statistic to ensure local differential privacy, so we denote it as
local private centroid classifier.
Non-private centroid classifier assumes the same setting as in DPPCC, but is privacy-
violating, as it excludes both DP and cryptosystem, the local statistic is directly shared
among all parties (maximum utility, minimum privacy).
Standalone centroid classifier excluded cryptosystem as participants train local mod-
els on local training data without any collaboration with other parties, then release their
private model parameters or test results by adding DP noise (maximum privacy, mini-
mum utility).
5.7.2 Datasets
We investigate the benefits of our DPPCC on three publicly available datasets: Parkin-
son Speech dataset [124], Breast Cancer Wisconsin dataset [125], and Cardiotocography
dataset [126]. The two-class Parkinson Speech dataset consists of 1040 training records,
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with each record containing 26 features. The Breast Cancer Wisconsin dataset contains
two subtypes (malignant and benign), with a total of 569 records, with each record con-
taining 32 features. The 3-class Cardiotocography dataset contains three subtypes, with a
total of 2126 records, and each record contains 23 features. Note that these datasets reflect
realistic, challenging scenarios for private learning in biomedical domains, in which rela-
tively few records are available. To simulate the situation in which each party constitutes
only a subset of the whole database, all the records in the whole database are randomly
distributed among different parties such that each party receives nearly the same amount
of records. We choose arbitrarily ten parties. All experiments were run based on 50 ran-
dom splits of data into separate training and test sets, where approximately 2/3 of the
samples from each class were assigned to the training set, while the remaining 1/3 were
assigned to the test set. For classification of the multi-class dataset, we use one-vs-all
strategy and average Area Under the Curve (AUC) over multiple centroid classifiers.
5.7.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
Four different models are implemented for performance evaluation, namely, global cen-
troid classifier, local private centroid classifier, non-private centroid classifier, and stan-
dalone centroid classifier, as stated in Section 5.7.1. We use the metric of Area Under the
Curve (AUC) for evaluation. The corresponding AUC results for B = 0 and unhinged loss
in case 1 are presented in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. Similarly, the corresponding AUC
results for B = 0 and unhinged loss in case 2 are shown in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7.
From these figures for both B = 0 and unhinged loss in case 1 and case 2 under
different privacy budgets ε within [0.01,5], it can be observed that: (i) global private cen-
troid classifier (our DPPCC) shows higher AUC than the standalone centroid classifiers,
because parties benefit from collaboration in DPPCC; (ii) DPPCC outperforms the local
private centroid classifier as less noise is added to locally released statistic, as long as the
aggregated noise in the global statistic meets the required level, the privacy of the global
statistic can be guaranteed with (ε, δ)-DP. In contrast, in local private centroid classifier,
each party needs to add the required level of noise (same level as the aggregated noise in
DPPCC) to ensure (ε, δ)-DP individually, hence much more noise is added to the locally
released statistic in local private centroid classifier compared to the noise added to the
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locally released statistic in DPPCC; (iii) DPPCC delivers comparable AUC to the non-
private centroid classifier in case 1 when ε ≥ 0.5 for B = 0 and ε ≥ 0.1 for unhinged
loss, mainly thanks to collaboration. However, in case 2, the AUC is more inclined to be
affected by the added noise than in case 1, as noise is directly added to the test result in
case 2, and sensitivity bound is proved to be higher than case 1, as indicated in Lemma 5.3
and Lemma 5.4. Although more noise is added, as expected, case 2 still follows the simi-
lar trend as in case 1. In addition, in local private centroid classifier, utility is dependent
on the number of parties, because each party adds differentially-private noise to ensure
(ε, δ)-DP individually, the noise in the aggregation becomes larger with the increasing
number of parties, resulting in significant degradation in utility with more parties.
























































Figure 5.4: Centroid classifier(B=0) AUC for all datasets in case 1 (δ = 0.05).
























































Figure 5.5: Centroid classifier(unhinged loss) AUC for all datasets in case 1 (δ = 0.05).
5.7.4 Parameter Selection
Number of parties. The nice theoretical property of the centroid classifier with linear
kernel ensures that our scheme’s utility is independent of the number of parties.
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Figure 5.6: Centroid classifier(B=0) AUC for all datasets in case 2 (δ = 0.05).
























































Figure 5.7: Centroid classifier(unhinged loss) AUC for all datasets in case 2 (δ = 0.05).
Scaling factor s. Scaling aims to minimise the effect of rounding on loss. If s is chosen
to be 10N , which means considering N digits to the right of the decimal point; If s = 1,
then the right of the decimal point is neglected, and the scalar is rounded to the nearest
integer; If s is chosen to be less than 1, such as 10−N , which means only N digits to the
left of the decimal point is considered. To further explore how to choose s, we take case
1 for analysis, Figure 5.8 shows the corresponding AUC values of DPPCC for B = 0 and
unhinged loss. It can be figured out that s = 1 significantly decreases the AUC compared
with s = 10, hence s should be chosen to be s ≥ 10.
5.7.5 Complexity Analysis
Communication cost. Take the Breast Cancer Wisconsin dataset for example, in case 1,
instead of sharing the original data matrix mi*32 (mi: records of party i, 32: number of
features), each party only shares the encrypted noisy weight vector of size 32 with other
parties. The number of features can be further reduced without compromising AUC, as
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Figure 5.8: DPPCC AUC with varying s in case 1.
manifested in [115]. Similarly, in cases 2 and 3, each party only shares the encrypted
noisy test result with other parties. It is apparent that the communication cost of case 2 is
lower than that of case 1, as the test result is a scalar.
Computation time. Our distributed ElGamal cryptosystem shown in Section 5.2.3
requires two rounds of communication among all parities. The first round is targeted at
forwarding the encryption of each party to all the other parties for partial decryption, and
the second round aims to distribute the partial decryption of each party to all the other
parties for final decryption. For encryption, running time is dominated by two modular
exponentiations. However, these exponentiations are independent of the message, thus
can be computed ahead of time. For efficient decryption, we build a look up table (LUT).
This only needs to be done once, since the encoding remains stable with successive runs.
The limit on the size of the LUT is determined by the available space and time to construct
it. Searching is fairly quick because it can be a sorted table. The time spent on different
stages for Breast Cancer Wisconsin dataset split among 4 parties with a threshold of 3 is
listed in Table 5.1, we set the range of LUT as [-100000, 100000], and average the timings
over 50 runs. Timing is proportional to the dimension of the released statistics, but each
party can run local training and partial decryption in parallel, hence the number of par-
ties has negligible impact on the timing. Moreover, timings will increase with larger key
size, however, it can be implemented in multi-threads. Therefore, our scheme is practical
in situations where the plaintext space is small. The encryption mechanism is indepen-
dent of the classifiers, and it has been verified in [115] that the centroid based approach
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is about seven to nine times faster even if the significant time required to search for the
optimal C for SVM is neglected.
Table 5.1: Time analysis for Breast Cancer Wisconsin dataset.
Stages Time (s)
Distributed key generation 1.6
Local model train 1.762
Encryption for one integer 0.055
Decryption for one integer 0.481
Assume we use 2048-bit prime, distributed key generation is run only once, where
each party publishes hi = gxi of 256 bytes to other parties, which needs around 2 mi-
croseconds to be transmitted over a 1 Gbps channel, and costs 256 ∗ (n− 1) bytes, where
n is total number of parties.
For each integer-valued plaintext, each party needs two rounds of communication for
encryption and decryption: (i) Each party sends ciphertext (c1, c2) of 512 bytes to other
parties; and (ii) Each party sends partial decryption of m′ of 256 bytes to other parties.
Hence, total 768 bytes are required for each integer. It takes around 6.1 microseconds to
be transmitted over a 1 Gbps channel. Since parties run distributed key generation, en-
cryption, and decryption in parallel, time complexity is independent on the total number
of parties n, in ideal communication channel without delay, for case 1 with d elements,
it takes 2 + 6.1 ∗ d microseconds. However, as each party needs to transmit message to
the remaining n − 1 parties, the communication complexity is linearly proportional to
both the number of elements d and total number of parties n, i.e., the total amount of
communication cost is (256 + 768 ∗ d) ∗ (n− 1) bytes.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, we present an efficient decentralized privacy preserving centroid classifier
(DPPCC) for three practical cases. It enables parties without significant computational
resources to deliver more accurate results from model aggregation or prediction. DPPCC
removes the assumption of any third party aggregator—trusted or otherwise—allowing
individuals control over their own data. This provides tremendous benefits in highly
sensitive application, such as distributed biomedical analysis.
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We provide theoretical analysis of the released noisy sum statistic, and introduce sta-
ble discrete Gaussian distribution to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy without any restric-
tions on ε. A distributed exponential ElGamal cryptosystem is developed to mitigate
utility loss and guarantee party obliviousness. Preliminary analysis and performance
evaluation indicate that DPPCC maintains privacy of each party, while delivers better
performance than the local private and standalone centroid classifier, and achieves com-
parable performance with the non-private centroid classifier.









Aggregation in Smart Grid
This chapter focuses on the application of smart metering, where aggregators aim to
mine the large amounts of distributed smart meter data that are required for specific
purposes, including billing, load modeling/forecasting, power theft detection, pricing
services, monitoring of power quality, and load management. A key problem in the
aggregation of smart metering is how to minimize the privacy leakage of the locally released
statistics while ensuring high utility. In privacy-preserving aggregation of smart meter data,
we consider honest-but-curious aggregators who aim to make queries on the aggregation
of smart meter data of individual users.
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6.1 Multi-Level Aggregation
The aggregation of energy consumption data at multiple levels of spatial granularity
(neighborhood, subdivision, district, city etc.) is essential for monitoring and predict-
ing power consumption, network planning and settlement, allocating and balancing
loads and resources, and administering power generation and prices according to de-
mand [9, 10, 18–21]. To derive multi-level privacy-preserving aggregation of smart meter
data, we use a more efficient and concentrated Gaussian mechanism to distribute noise
generation among parties, thus offering provable differential privacy guarantees of the
aggregate statistics on both fog and cloud levels. In addition, to ensure aggregator obliv-
iousness and system robustness, we put forward a two-layer encryption scheme: the first
layer applies a one-time pad (OTP) to encrypt individual noisy measurements to achieve
aggregator obliviousness, while the second layer uses public-key cryptography for au-
thentication purposes. Our scheme is simple, efficient and practical, it requires only one
round of data exchange between an end node (i.e., smart meter), its connected fog node
and the cloud if there are no node failures, otherwise, one extra round is needed between
an end node, its connected fog node and the trusted third party. In our model, both
the fog node and the cloud are assumed to be honest-but-curious. They might attempt
to discover private information about any user, without deviating from the protocol.
The end nodes (i.e., tamper-resistant smart meters) can store keys and perform crypto-
graphic computations but do not trust each other. The noise generation task is distributed
amongst end nodes and fog nodes. Based on this assumption, we propose a distributed
aggregation model, which is synchronous and non-interactive. Furthermore, our scheme
only requires the end nodes to store O(1) values, but does not require any bidirectional
communication channels from the aggregator to the end nodes or among end nodes. We
consider how an honest-but-curious aggregator can learn desired statistics over multiple
parties’ data, without compromising any party’s privacy.
For efficient multi-level aggregation, one potential approach is to rely on the emerg-
ing fog architecture as the basis for in-network aggregation, which corresponds to the
sum at the fog nodes or the cloud (e.g. the addition on the plaintext), namely, each fog
node computes f (x1, . . . , xs) = ∑si=1xi for s smart meters in its covered area, and the
cloud calculates f (x1, . . . , xn) = ∑ni=1xi for the total n smart meters. The aggregation
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task can be distributed to the intermediate fog nodes, with reasonable extra overhead
(e.g. addition and decryption on the ciphertext). The superiority of in-network aggre-
gation in terms of communication and energy consumption are manifested in [18]. In
addition, our framework provides different levels of aggregation by leveraging the inter-
mediate fog nodes to forward the fog level aggregation of the downstream end nodes,
rather than transmitting numerous sensitive measurements directly to the cloud. Since
measurements of end nodes are aggregated at the nearby fog nodes, communication cost
is significantly reduced. The energy savings of performing in-network aggregation have
been shown to be significant and crucial for energy-constrained sensor networks [18].
In our work, we interchangeably use consumers/users/parties/smart meters/partici-
pants/end nodes/sensors to refer to the bottom level smart meters, similarly for aggre-
gator/fog node at the middle level, and cloud/service provider at the top level.
6.2 Aggregation Model in Smart Grid
In general, the models for aggregating statistics from multiple parties fall into the follow-
ing two categories: sensor-cloud-via-gateway and sensor-fog-cloud.
• sensor-cloud-via-gateway: In a typical IoT network, the cloud collects the encrypted
sensor data which are usually forwarded by multi-level gateways. Once the cloud
receives the required measurements from all the responding end nodes, it decrypts
and derives the desired statistics for further analytics. We refer to this framework
as sensor-cloud-via-gateway. Obviously, such a framework exhibits several disad-
vantages. First, in the case of numerous end nodes, as all the measurements are
forwarded towards the cloud through multiple gateways, it consumes scarce band-
width, and unavoidably leads to traffic congestion and heavy loads on the cloud.
Hence, it is susceptible to Denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) with incoming traffic
flooding, as well as lacking scalability. Furthermore, it incurs high power/energy
consumption owing to high volumes of data transmission from end nodes to the
remote cloud.
• sensor-fog-cloud: The most recent hierarchical in-network data aggregation schemes
use less powerful intermediate nodes, i.e., sensor node/gateway to conduct the ex-
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Figure 6.1: sensor-fog-cloud aggregation model at time slot t.
pensive encryption and aggregation operations [19]. However, a scalability prob-
lem arises as the intermediate nodes cannot support large-scale downstream end
nodes, thus limiting its application. To address the resource and scalability is-
sues mentioned above, we instead employ sensor-fog-cloud framework, in which
fog node takes the role of the intermediate in-network aggregator by connecting
with s downstream smart meters. Each sensor meter perturbs its measurement as
per sensor level noise, then sends its encrypted noisy measurement to the nearby
fog node at each sampling period. Data aggregation and decryption are performed
directly on the ciphertext at the nearby fog node, which provides a fine-grained fog
level aggregation. Then the decrypted fog level aggregation is further perturbed by
the fog level noise and encrypted under the fog node’s secret key, then forwarded
to the cloud eventually. Cloud level aggregation is derived by aggregating the re-
ceived fog level aggregation from all the f fog nodes, followed by decryption to
obtain the noisy sum of all the measurements of n end nodes.
The sensor-fog-cloud aggregation model is illustrated in Figure 6.1. For the readers’
convenience, Tables 6.1 contains a list of symbols used in our work.
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Table 6.1: Table of symbols.
Symbol Meaning
Enc homomorphic encryption function
Dec homomorphic decryption function
Fj/Si sensor i connected to fog node j
Fog/j fog node j
Xtji measurement at Fj/Si
rtji noise at Fj/Si
Atj fog level aggregation at Fog/j
EAtj encrypted fog level aggregation at Fog/j
rtj noise at Fog/j
AtC cloud level aggregation at cloud
f total f fog nodes
s total s SMs connected to each fog node
n total n = s ∗ f SMs in the system
t time slot t
σs noise level required for each sensor
σf noise level required for each fog node
6.3 Privacy-Preserving Fog Aggregation
6.3.1 Privacy Model
We formulate a notion of privacy in smart metering. The traditional differential privacy
assumes the presence of a trusted data aggregator who is entitled to see all participants’
data in the clear and publish statistics. Our privacy model is stronger in the sense that we
do not trust the data aggregator. We ensure that the data aggregator is only able to learn
the intended statistics and no additional information. Our scheme protects each individ-
ual participant’s privacy even when the aggregator has arbitrary auxiliary information
(such as public datasets on the web, or through personal knowledge about a specific par-
ticipant) about a participant’s data but has not compromised its secret key, or colludes
with a subset of compromised participants, who can arbitrarily reveal their data or noise
to the aggregator [10].
Our goal is to guarantee the privacy of each individual’s data against an honest-but-
curious aggregator, even when the aggregator has arbitrary auxiliary information. At a
high level, our formal privacy notion consists of two properties:
• Aggregator Oblivious. The aggregator can learn only the noisy sum for each time
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slot, and nothing more. Without knowing the aggregator decryption key, one learns
nothing about the encrypted data. If the aggregator colludes with a small subset of
compromised participants, or if a subset of the encrypted data has been leaked,
then the aggregator can inevitably learn the sum of the remaining participants, in
this case, the aggregator learns no additional information about the remaining par-
ticipants’ data.
• Distributed Differential Privacy. In our model, the participants need not trust the
data aggregator or other participants. The required noise in the target statistic is
collected from all participants.
Malicious participants that deviate arbitrarily from protocol by modifying, re-
playing, removing or lying about their values in an attempt to sway the target statistic
are out of the scope of this chapter. However, one possible defense is for each participant
to use a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to prove that its encrypted data lies within
a valid range, e.g., {0, 1, · · · , ∆}. In this way, each participants’s influence is bounded.
6.3.2 Distributed Differential Privacy (DDP)
To achieve (ε, δ)-DDP, we employ Dwork and Roth’s Gaussian mechanism [22, Theorem
A.1] shown in Theorem 2.2. The Gaussian mechanism adds Gaussian noise scaled to
N(0, σ2) to each element of the T query responses, where T is the number of time slots.
The aggregate function sums over the measurements of a total of n users as a sequence
Q of length T, i.e., f (x1, . . . , xn) = ∑ni=1xi, where xi represents the measurement of user
i in T time slots. At each time slot t, xti (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) are summed up in a private






, where σ is the
noise required to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy of the cloud level aggregation in each
slot by following Theorem 2.2. These individual noisy values add up to:












For aggregation of time-series data, Shi et al.’s scheme [10] provides each partici-
pant’s differential privacy for every time period, suppose that Mt satisfies ε-DP for each
t ∈ [1, T], according to Theorem 2.1, it achieves Tε-DP on user-level. Instead, we focus on
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providing differential privacy for each participant’s daily profile. Because the values of a
time-series is a vector, we use L2 sensitivity of the query function f (sum of all measure-
ments over T time slots) as defined in Definition 2.1. Here, f corresponds to the query
function to answer a query sequence with T query responses. Since data can differ in an
arbitrary smart meter and the function f corresponds to the sum operation, we choose
an empirical value of ∆ (domain bound) as the global sensitivity, i.e., worst-case scenario.




Theorem 6.1. Given the DDP parameter constraints in Theorem 2.2, and ∆2 f in Equation 6.2,
the released sum in Equation 6.1 is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
In practice, it seems reasonable that a good estimation for the upper bound is al-
ready known. We remark that by using a naturally-weaker form of privacy, i.e., random
differential privacy, while replacing worst-case global sensitivity bounds with estimated
(actual) sensitivities by assuming data is only bounded with high probability, far superior
utility than existing approaches is expected [127, 128].
6.3.3 Encryption Scheme
The DDP procedure described in Section 6.3.2 is not sufficient to guarantee privacy. In
order to achieve O(1) error, only the sum (with Gaussian noise N(0, σ2)) of individually
released statistic is differentially private, but not the individually released statistic (with
Gaussian noise N(0, σ
2




i meets the requirement for differential privacy,




i cannot be released directly.
To address this problem, we use an additively homomorphic encryption scheme to en-
crypt the noisy measurement such that the fog node and the cloud can only decrypt the
sum of the measurements of its corresponding downstream nodes, but cannot access any
of them. Vernam cipher or one-time pad (OTP) has been mathematically proved to be
completely secure, it cannot be broken given unbounded ciphertext and time. Therefore,
we use OTP for additively homomorphic encryption. OTP uses a keystream of random
digits in a similar way to secret sharing. The main idea of forming the ciphertext is to
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combine the keystream with the plaintext digits using modular addition one at a time.
However, the keystream must be generated completely at random with at least the same
length as the plaintext and cannot be used more than once. In addition, the keystream
must be kept secure.
In our encryption scheme, a distinct OTP is assumed to be pre-shared between all the
participating n sensors, f fog nodes and the cloud through a trusted setup procedure.
No further interaction is required except for uploading the encrypted noisy value in each
time slot. Each node is configured with a private key and corresponding certificate. The
trusted setup can be implemented by a trusted third party or through a standard SMC
protocol [10]. For example, each country might have a third party (key management
authority) who can generate these certificates and additional “supplier” certificates to
supplier companies [129].
The cloud’s master key is denoted as k, and the pad pre-shared by each fog node and
the cloud is denoted as k j, such that ∑
f
j=1k j = k, where 0 < j ≤ f uniquely identifies a
particular fog node. Similarly, the pad pre-shared by each sensor and the corresponding
jth fog node is denoted as k ji, such that ∑si=1k ji = k j, where 0 < i ≤ s uniquely identifies
a particular sensor among a total of s sensors connected with the jth fog node. Therefore,
the cloud can only obtain the sum of the fog level aggregation of all the fog nodes, and
each fog node can only obtain the sum of the measurements of the connected lower level
end nodes. Meanwhile, rather than a XOR operation typically found in stream ciphers,
which is insecure under frequency analysis, our encryption scheme uses modular addi-
tion (+), which is very well suited for CPU-constrained devices like sensors. In practice,
if p = max(xi), M can be derived as M = 2dlog2(p×n)e.
The OTP scheme only consists of a modular addition operation, thus avoiding the
computationally expensive public key cryptosystem. A pseudorandom keystream k can
be generated by a secure pseudo random function (PRF) by implementing a secure stream
cipher, such as Trivium, which is keyed with an end node’s secret key k ji and a unique
message ID.
Compared with SMC and existing solutions that require several rounds of communi-
cation, our protocol merely needs a one-time setup between the cloud, fog nodes and all
end nodes. This is beneficial for resource-constrained smart metering system. Moreover,
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in our setting all shares k ji (0 < i ≤ s) of the secret keys are involved to decrypt any
ciphertext, thus no SM is able to decrypt any ciphertext alone.
6.3.4 PPFA Procedure
At each time slot t, each fog node computes the sum of the measurements of all the down-





and the cloud aims to aggregate fog level aggregation of all the fog nodes, following the
procedure shown in Algorithm 6.1. As per composition property of DP in Theorem 2.3
and Theorem 2.4, the privacy budget ε is allocated to different levels, i.e., εs (sensor-fog),
and ε f (fog-cloud). As transmission from sensor to the fog node is much more sensitive
than transmission from fog node to the cloud, hence sensor-fog should be allocated a
lower privacy budget. For example, we can add noise as per εs = 0.02 to the original
smart meter data at the bottom level, and noise as per ε f = 0.08 to the middle fog level
aggregation.
Algorithm 6.1 PPFA Procedure
Smart meter i: data sanitization and encryption
1: Data sanitization: At each time slot t, SM i that connects to fog node j computes noisy value
xtji + DDP(x
t
ji, σs), and rounds it to the nearest integer x̂
t
ji ∈ [0, M − 1], where M is a large
integer.
2: Encryption: Let k ji be the pad pre-shared by fog node j and SM i, where k ji ∈ [0, M− 1], SM
i computes ctji = Enc(x̂
t
ji, k ji, M) = x̂
t
ji + k ji (mod M).
Fog node j: fog level aggregation, decrypt aggregation, aggregation sanitization and encrypt
noisy aggregation





2: Decrypt aggregation: Decrypt the encrypted fog level aggregation as Atj = Dec(c
t
j, k j, M) =
ctj − k j (mod M).
3: Aggregation sanitization: Add noise to the decrypted aggregation as Atj + DDP(A
t
j, σf ), and
round the noisy value to integer Âtj ∈ [0, M− 1].
4: Encrypt noisy aggregation: Encrypt Âtj as
ˆEAtj = Enc(Â
t
j, k j, M) = Â
t
j + k j (mod M) and
forward it to the cloud.
Cloud: cloud level aggregation, and cloud level decryption
1: Cloud level aggregation: Derive the sum of the encrypted noisy fog level aggregation at the









t, k, M) = ct − k (mod M) = ∑ fj=1 Âtj.
It has been shown that differential privacy is immune to post-processing in [22, Propo-
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sition 2.1], therefore, a differentially private query remains differentially private after
post-processing [11]. This property allows the fog nodes and the cloud to apply any post-
processing function on the output of a differentially private algorithm without diminish-
ing the privacy properties. This property is further exploited in Section 6.5.2 by smooth-
ing the differentially private aggregation of load profiles to improve utility. Theorem 6.2
states that a differentially private aggregation of load profiles remains differentially pri-
vate after an arbitrary deterministic mapping [11], which is less general compared with
an arbitrary randomized mapping in [22, Proposition 2.1]. This theorem ensures that a
smoothed differentially private signal with a moving average filter remains differentially
private.
Theorem 6.2. Let f : Rn ×RT → RT be a (ε, δ)-differentially private query function with T
queries and g : RT → RT be an arbitrary deterministic mapping. Then
g ◦ f : Rn ×RT → RT
is also (ε, δ)-differentially private.
6.4 System Robustness
6.4.1 Authenticity
In smart grid, to verify the authenticity of the received message (authentication) and
check that the received message is intact (integrity), i.e., ensuing an encrypted message
is sent by a legal residential user and has not been altered during the transmission, and
preventing unauthorized nodes from injecting fake packets in the networks, we propose
a two-layer encryption scheme: the first layer applies OTP to ensure aggregator obliv-
iousness, while the second layer uses public-key cryptography as digital signatures to
provide authentication and integrity, which also provides non-repudiation. If the adver-
sary forges or modifies any message, this malicious behaviour should be detected and
the message should be abandoned. Therefore, only the correct message can be received
by the aggregator for electricity use monitoring. As such, each SM should have a private
key and public key pair. Each fog node uses public keys of the connected SMs to authen-
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ticate the received messages which are encrypted under the corresponding private keys.
Therefore, only the connected fog node who owns the corresponding decryption key can
decrypt the received message, and the adversary’s malicious behaviours in smart grid
communication can be detected.
6.4.2 Node Failure
We have assumed so far that all the s nodes are connected to each fog node, and all the
f fog nodes participate in the protocol. However, it might happen that, one or more
smart meters fail to participate in a certain time slot for several different reasons (e.g.,
node or communication failures). This would introduce two effects: first, differential pri-
vacy may not be guaranteed any more, since the sum of the noise will not be equivalent
to the required level σ. Second, the aggregator will not be able to decrypt the correct
aggregate statistics, since ∑si=1k ji = k j will not hold any more. Fault tolerance requires
the aggregator to be resilient to node failures, i.e., aggregator can still be able to estimate
the correct aggregate statistics of the remaining users even when an arbitrary subset of
users (unknown in advance) fail. Notice that all the existing fault tolerance schemes in-
troduce either communication/computation/storage complexity or utility loss. Without
fault tolerance, Rastogi et al. [9] and Shi et al. [10] introduce only O(1) error by DDP,
while Chan [130] offers fault tolerance at the cost of polylogarithmic error dependent on
the number of absent users. In this section, we further extend our scheme to resist node
failures by introducing setup extension and sanitization extension.
Setup Extension. One advantage of in-network aggregation is that the failure of any
smart meters will only affect the aggregation result of its connected fog node and cloud,
without interfering with other SMs and their connected fog nodes. However, the failure
can be detected immediately by its connected fog node as its message ID will not be re-
ceived. Then the failed ID will be reported to the trusted third party, who initializes the
trusted setup and issues certificates to all the nodes in the system. To deal with node fail-
ure and ensure the correctness of decryption, the trusted third party will update the OTP
kept by its connected fog node as the negative sum of the remaining connected nodes,
and the pad kept by the cloud to be the negative sum of all the fog nodes. Therefore,
the corresponding keys of the non-responding end nodes will not be included during
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decryption at the immediate fog node and cloud to ensure the correctness of the fog level
and cloud level aggregation. Hence, our solution requires only uni-directional communi-
cation, and is much more efficient and simple: it requires setup only once if there are no
node failures, otherwise, one extra setup is needed only among the trusted third party,
the affected fog node (connected by the failed nodes) and the cloud.
Sanitization Extension. The proposed sanitization extension can resist the failure
of up to n − t out of n nodes, where t refers to the number of honest participants. In
order to resist the failure of n− t nodes, each node should follow the strategy below to
add noise to individual measurements: If at least t honest participants out of a total of n
participants participate in the protocol, then we can distribute the noise generation task
amongst these t participants. Our construction guarantees that, with high probability, the
revealed aggregate statistic meets DP by accumulating noise from the honest participants.
Each honest party samples ri from a Gaussian distribution of standard deviation σi =
σ√
t
instead of σ√n , then the total noise in their sum still satisfies the expected standard
deviation σ, i.e., ri is chosen from a Gaussian distribution that is sufficient to guarantee
differential privacy, hence the aggregation remains differentially private. Note that in
this case each node may add extra noise to the aggregation in order to ensure differential
privacy even if less than n − t nodes fail to send their noise shares to the aggregator.
Clearly, this extra noise increases the error if all n nodes operate correctly and add their
noise shares faithfully. In the worst case, if every participant believes that the other n−
1 participants are disfunctional, each participant would need to add sufficient noise to
ensure local differential privacy of its own data, resulting in a large error in the aggregate
statistic.
6.4.3 Node Joins and Departures
Our scheme also supports node joins and departures, whenever a participant joins or
leaves the system, the trusted key setup phase needs to be restarted among the join-
ing/leaving node, its connected fog node and cloud. To be more specific, when a new
node joins, the protocol is restarted by re-issuing the OTP shared between the new node
and its connected fog node, and between all the fog nodes and cloud. When a node
leaves, it will be excluded and the OTP will be re-issued to its previously connected fog
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node and cloud. This scheme is applicable in smart metering scenarios, where partici-
pants are relatively static over time.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance of the proposed PPFA scheme is evaluated in terms of
utility analysis, accuracy analysis, communication complexity of sensor-cloud-via-gateway
and sensor-fog-cloud models, and computation complexity of different DP mechanisms.
6.5.1 Utility Analysis
As most cryptosystems work in discrete domain of integers, therefore, we convert
floating-point numbers to integers via the Scaling, Rounding, Unscaling (SRU) algorithm
in Algorithm 5.2. The detailed analysis for the effect of SRU is presented in Lemma 6.1.
Lemma 6.1. (SRU loss of PPFA). For a specific scaling factor s and perturbed data of party i:
x̂i = xi + ri, where x̂i ∈ RT. The loss due to the SRU is upper-bounded by n
√
T/(2s), where n
and T refer to the number of smart meters and time slots respectively.
Proof. Before transmission, each party applies scaling, and rounding on the perturbed
data x̂i ∈ RT. After the upper-level fog node/cloud sums over the received data, the





















Denote x̂i := [x̂i1, ..., x̂iT], for any j ∈ [1, ..., T], as |bsx̂ije− sx̂ij| ≤ 12 , hence ‖bsx̂ie− sx̂i‖2 ≤√
T
2 . It then follows ‖∑
n
i=1(bsx̂ie − sx̂i)‖2 ≤ n
√
T





Theorem 6.3. For each user, if the released local statistic (smart meter data vector) xi ∈ RT
has DDP Gaussian noise added, then the cloud-level aggregation x that sums over all noisy local
statistics is (ε, δ)-differentially private, provided that total Gaussian noise r := (r1, ..., rT) meets
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variance requirement of Gaussian distribution in Theorem 2.2: c2 > 2 ln(1.25/δ), σ ≥ c∆2 f /ε,
where 0 < ε < 1, and ∆2 f is the L2 sensitivity of f .
Corollary 6.1. (PPFA L2 error bound). The error of the cloud-level aggregation of PPFA is higher
bounded by
√
T( n2s + σ
2ε/∆2 f − ∆2 f /2), where T and n refer to the number of time slots and
number of smart meters, s and ∆2 f denote the scaling factor and L2 sensitivity of f respectively.
Proof. As stated in Lemma 6.1, lossSRU ≤ n
√
T













Where ri is party i’s T-dimensional noise vector, and r = ∑ni=1 ri is the total amount
of noise required to ensure (ε, δ)-DP of the aggregate statistic x = ∑ni=1xi.
As stated in [22, Appendices A], to ensure (ε, δ)-DP, it is required that with proba-
bility at least 1− δ, each element of r is bounded by σ2ε/∆2 f − ∆2 f /2. Therefore, with
probability at least 1− δ, the following statements hold: ‖r‖2 ≤
√
T(σ2ε/∆2 f − ∆2 f /2),
BE ≤
√
T( n2s + σ
2ε/∆2 f − ∆2 f /2).
6.5.2 Accuracy Analysis
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Figure 6.2: Aggregation at different levels for original and (ε, δ)-differentially private
daily load profiles (ε = 0.99, δ = 0.1).
We use the publicly available real-world smart meter dataset from Ireland’s Commis-
sion for Energy Regulation [131] for evaluation, which consists of 3000 residential homes
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Figure 6.3: MRE at different levels for (ε, δ)-DP and smoothed (ε, δ)-DP aggregation of
daily load profiles (ε = 0.99, δ = 0.1).
over 17 months from August 2009 to December 2010. For the experimental implemen-
tation, we apply a three-level architecture for evaluation, where the fog level consists of
three fog nodes. Each fog node is responsible for the aggregation of 1000 homes at the
bottom level, and the cloud aggregates all the fog level aggregations. Electrical load con-
sumption usually exhibits a daily periodicity pattern, and this dataset collects 49 records
per day. The average error for each day (T = 49 slots) is averaged over both T = 49 time
slots and 100 runs. The aggregate result is post-processed by smoothing through a mov-
ing average filter with a span of 5 to reduce the effect of noise. For sensitivity estimation,
we choose ∆ as the maximum value of smart meter data each househould might spend
in each time slot of all daily load profiles. For real-world smart meter daily profiles, the
degradation of accuracy is assessed both by visualization and error analysis. The error
evaluation for each slot (T = 1) and all the T slots are based on the Mean Relative Error

















In Figure 6.2, the dash-blue line shows the original aggregation of daily load profiles
at different levels, while the plus-red line corresponds to the aggregation of our proposed
PPFA method. It can be observed that PPFA follows consistent trend as the target profile.
The corresponding MRE results for DP aggregation and smoothed DP aggregation at
different levels over different slots are plotted in Figure 6.3, where after smoothing post-
processing, even in the worst case, MRE values over all slots are still lower than 20%.
Figure 6.4 measures MRE over multiple slots under different privacy budget ε. The
experimental results follow the theoretic analysis, i.e., lower ε results in more noise and
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higher error, however, after post-processing, even in the worst case in our experimenta-
tion (ε = 0.5), MRE is still lower than 15%.
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Figure 6.4: MRE at different levels for (ε, δ)-DP and smoothed (ε, δ)-DP aggregation under
different privacy budget ε (δ = 0.1).
Furthermore, the effect of the relaxed probability δ is explored in Figure 6.5, which
illustrates the MRE over multiple slots under different relaxed probability δ, ranging from
[0.001, 0.1]. The experimental results manifest our theoretic analysis, i.e., lower δ tends to
be closer to the pure ε-DP, leading to more noise and higher error. However, after post-
processing, even in the worst case in our experimentation (δ = 0.001), MRE is still lower
than 25%.
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Figure 6.5: MRE at different levels for (ε, δ)-DP and smoothed (ε, δ)-DP aggregation under
different relaxed probability δ (ε = 0.5).
To manifest the superiority of DDP, we further study the impact of Local Differential
Privacy (LDP), where each node adds enough noise to guarantee LDP. Figure 6.6 shows
the original aggregation of daily load profiles at different levels, and the aggregation
of daily load profiles at different levels that are perturbed by LDP. In comparison with
Figure 6.2, it can be clearly observed that LDP significantly degrade the utility as LDP
aggregation sums up individual noise values, rendering it largely deviating from the
target profile.
To compare with ε-DP, we implement the DP scheme used in Ács et al. [8], and
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Figure 6.6: Aggregation at different levels for original and (ε, δ)-LDP daily load profiles
(ε = 0.99, δ = 0.1).
Eibl [11], where the divisibility of Laplace distribution is constructed as the sum of i.i.d.
gamma distributions. The corresponding MRE results for DP aggregation and smoothed
DP aggregation at different levels over all time slots are plotted in Figure 6.7, where MRE
is quite high even after smoothing post-processing. Figure 6.8 shows MRE at different
levels over all time slots and privacy budget ε. After post-processing, even in the best
case in our experimentation (ε = 0.99), MRE is still higher than 15%. The comparison
results demonstrate the superiority of our concentrated Gaussian mechanism, thereby
confirming our theoretic analysis.
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Figure 6.7: MRE at different levels for ε-DP and smoothed ε-DP aggregation of daily load
profiles (ε = 0.99).
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Figure 6.8: MRE at different levels for ε-DP and smoothed ε-DP aggregation under dif-
ferent privacy budget ε.
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6.5.3 Complexity Analysis
Communication Complexity. The communication complexity analysis from the perspective
of end node level is outlined in Table 6.2. In sensor-cloud-via-gateway, end nodes have
to transmit large volume of data to the remote cloud via multiple gateways, while in
sensor-fog-cloud, fog node is one-hop away from end nodes, we denote the transmission
distance from end nodes to remote cloud and nearby fog node as dsc, and ds f respectively,
where ds f  dsc. Similarly, as the transmission energy is exponentially proportional to
transmission distance, sensor-cloud-via-gateway incurs much more energy consumption
compared with sensor-fog-cloud.
Table 6.2: Communication complexity analysis.
Communication complexity sensor-cloud-via-gateway sensor-fog-cloud
Energy Consumption O(edsc) O(eds f )
Bandwidth Bottleneck O(n) O(s)
Delay Tsc Ts f +Tf c
Moreover, in sensor-cloud-via-gateway, each end node has to share the bandwidth with
all the other n − 1 nodes, while it reduces to s − 1 in sensor-fog-cloud, where s nodes
connect to the same fog node. In terms of delay, the transmission time from end nodes
to the cloud and nearby fog node are referred to as Tsc and Ts f respectively, and Tf c is
the transmission time from fog node to the cloud, where Ts f  Tsc, Tf c  Tsc, therefore,
Ts f + Tf c  2Tsc. It indicates that sensor-cloud-via-gateway requires longer time to derive
the desired statistics, thus hindering its application in time-critical IoT applications.
Regarding the communication complexity, the results in Table 6.2 demonstrate that
sensor-fog-cloud performs better, which verifies its benefits in reducing energy cost, ex-
tending the battery life, uplifting bandwidth efficiency and achieving timely transmis-
sion.
Computation Complexity. To demonstrate the efficiency of our DDP mechanism with
Gaussian distribution, we compare with other approaches to DDP, including gamma dis-
tribution used in Ács et al. [8] and Eibl [11], and geometric distribution used in Shi et
al. [10]. Table 6.3 shows the time spent on 1000 runs by Matlab R2016a under the param-
eter settings in Section 6.5.2. It can be seen that Gaussian mechanism offers substantial
performance improvement, which is over 450 times faster than both gamma and geomet-
6.6 Summary 119
ric distribution. For further detailed comparison of approaches to DDP, the interested
reader is referred to the survey paper [132].
Table 6.3: Computation complexity analysis.





For smart metering, we focus on how to preserve privacy of the load profiles of users. To
minimize privacy leakage of the locally released smart meter data and maintain utility
with well scaling error, we combine DDP with homomorphic encryption to ensure differ-
ential privacy of the aggregate statistic, and aggregator obliviousness, i.e., the honest-but-
curious aggregator can periodically collect data and derive aggregate statistics without
inferring additional information about any parties.
To facilitate fine-grained aggregation, and consider bandwidth and energy bottle-
necks, we explore an efficient and privacy-preserving aggregation model with the aid
of fog computing architecture, named PPFA. It enables the intermediate fog nodes to pe-
riodically collect data from the connected smart meters and derive fine-grained fog level
aggregation for further cloud level aggregation, thus conserving communication energy.
To preserve privacy, maintain utility, and ensure system robustness, in addition to using
DDP with Gaussian mechanism to guarantee differential privacy of the aggregate statis-
tic, a two-layer encryption scheme is proposed. It combines the efficient stream cipher
with public-key cryptography, the only degradation in accuracy is introduced deliber-
ately to satisfy differential privacy. Our privacy model is stronger in the sense that we do
not trust the aggregator. We ensure that the aggregator is only able to learn the desired
statistics without knowing additional information. Furthermore, our model supports
malfunction/non-responding nodes and node joining and leaving. Finally, we give a
theoretical analysis for the utility loss, and conduct a comprehensive analysis on the per-
formance of a real-world smart meter dataset, confirming the superiority of our proposed
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scheme.
If you wish to succeed, you should use persistence as
your good friend, experience as your reference, pru-




In this thesis, we first investigate a range of practical privacy-preserving machine learn-
ing applications using different frameworks, including collaborative anomaly detection
and human activity recognition using centralized framework, and biomedical domain
application using decentralized framework. We tackle the security challenges in collabo-
rative anomaly detection with a two-stage scheme called RG+RT to mitigate maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimation attacks, and independent component analysis (ICA) attack. For
privacy-preserving human activity recognition, RG+RP is proposed to resist MAP esti-
mation and ICA attacks, while maintaining model accuracy. These proposed two-stage
randomisation schemes are assessed in terms of their recovery resistance to MAP estima-
tion attacks. Preliminary theoretical analysis as well as experimental results on synthetic
and real-world datasets demonstrate that both RG+RT and RG+RP exhibit better recov-
ery resistance to MAP estimation attacks than state-of-the-art techniques, meanwhile,
high utility is guaranteed. For decentralized privacy-preserving machine learning, we
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first examine the practical limitations in the server-based frameworks, then investigate
the potential of a decentralized framework, focusing on biomedical domain as motiva-
tion. An efficient Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Centroid Classifier (DPPCC) is developed
for three practical scenarios, where a stable discrete Gaussian mechanism is adapted to re-
alize distributed differential privacy without putting any restriction on the privacy bud-
get ε, and a distributed exponential ElGamal cryptosystem is leveraged to maintain util-
ity and ensure party obliviousness. Only the encrypted noisy model parameters or model
predictions are shared among all the parties, ensuring that each party learns nothing but
the noisy sum of local statistics. The comprehensive experimental study on biomedical
datasets demonstrate that our proposed DPPCC outperforms the local private centroid
classifier and standalone centroid classifier, and achieves comparable performance to the
non-private centroid classifier.
Next, we study how to derive accurate multi-level data aggregation, reduce trans-
mission energy, and preserve user privacy in smart grid application. To this end, we
propose a fog-enabled architecture to derive multi-level aggregation of smart meter data.
To minimize privacy leakage and mitigate utility, we use a more efficient and concen-
trated Gaussian mechanism to distribute noise generation among parties, thus offering
provable privacy guarantees of the aggregate statistics. In addition, to ensure aggregator
obliviousness and system robustness, we put forward a two-layer encryption scheme: the
first layer applies a one-time pad (OTP) to encrypt individual noisy measurement in an
additively homomorphic manner to achieve aggregator obliviousness, while the second
layer uses public-key cryptography to ensure system robustness, including authenticity,
node failure, node joins and departures.
We anticipate that our decentralized framework would be beneficial to many open
problems at the intersection of machine learning and privacy, including how to facilitate
collaboration and ensure privacy and fairness. A number of avenues for further work are
attractive. In particular, we would like to further explore the following problems:
1. A major shortcoming of applying differential privacy mechanisms with global sen-
sitivity is that global sensitivity always bounds the worst-case analysis, which
would decrease the utility. One alternative is to run privatising mechanisms with
lower sensitivity (estimated or actual) by assuming data is only bounded with high
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probability, while maintaining (a weaker form of) differential privacy, i.e., random
differential privacy [127, 128]. In this way, far superior utility than existing ap-
proaches is expected.
2. Robustness against malicious participants in different frameworks is a challenging
task, since malicious participants can deviate arbitrarily from protocol by modify-
ing, re-playing, removing or lying about their values. Chapter 5 provides solutions
to resist Byzantine faults and availability attack by blinding the aggregated value
prior to decryption in the decentralized framework. Other various attacks in other
frameworks and corresponding solutions are yet to be explored. For example, fed-
erated learning is uniquely vulnerable to attacks that introduce hidden backdoor
functionality into the jointly learned global model, i.e., any participant in federated
learning can introduce hidden backdoor functionality into the joint global model,
e.g., to ensure that an image classifier assigns an attacker-chosen label to images
with certain features, or that a word predictor completes certain sentences with
an attacker-chosen word [133]. Secure aggregation makes the problem even worse
because it prevents the aggregator from auditing the participants’ submissions en-
tirely [133]. Another attack in the distributed/federated framework is GAN at-
tack [46], where an adversarial party can intentionally compromise any other party
via a parameter server by exploiting the real-time nature of the learning process.
During the iterative learning process, the adversarial party can train a GAN to gen-
erate prototypical samples of the targeted training data from other parties that was
meant to be private. Hence, it’s worthwhile to investigate model robustness in the
presence of arbitrarily misbehaving participants for future research.
3. The existing frameworks, whether centralized, distributed or decentralized, are
all based on the assumption that all the parties contribute equally. In reality, the
real-world datasets could be unbalanced and non-independent and identically dis-
tributed (non-IID), because some parties may invest a lot of time and effort to har-
vest high-quality data (for example, in terms of sample quantity, sample distribu-
tion over different classes, collecting most informative samples, data cleaning, etc.),
while other parties may contribute next to nothing. However, in the end, all the
parties can access the same global model or derive similar models no matter how
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differently they contribute. This is an essential problem that has been overlooked
by far. And this can be an obstacle for the spread of collaborative learning as a
new type of powerful learning platform. Building a fair and privacy-preserving
learning framework is crucial to make privacy-aware financial or biomedical insti-
tutions feel comfortable to join the system and enjoy the benefits brought by data
sharing and collaboration. It would be beneficial to build a credibility mechanism
to audit participants’ contribution without compromising individual privacy and
degrading model performance on its main task. Meanwhile, credibility is helpful
to detect malicious participants with low credibility, hence isolating these partici-
pants. Henceforth, how to design a fair collaborative machine learning system is
an important topic for future research.
A
Appendix
A.1 Stability of Discrete Gaussian Distribution
Definition A.1. (Discrete Gaussian distribution). The probability mass function (pmf) of a dis-
crete Gaussian distribution is proportional to the probability density function (pdf) of its contin-
uous version. The probability mass function for any X ∈ Z is therefore defined as:







Corollary A.1. (Stability of discrete Gaussian distribution). The discrete Gaussian distribution
shares the stability property of continuous Gaussians, i.e., the sum of independent discrete Gaus-
sian distributed random variables still follows a discrete Gaussian distribution.
Proof. If X and Y are independent random variables from two (possibly) different discrete
Gaussian distribution, then the distribution of Z = X +Y equals the discrete convolution
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of pmfs of X and Y: P(Z = z) = ∑+∞x=−∞ P(X = x)P(Y = z− x).
Given fX and fY referring to different pdfs for the corresponding continuous Gaussian
distributions with






2σ2X , x ∈ Z






2σ2Y , y ∈ Z
Substituting into the convolution:























































































































































































































: [−∞, µ −
1], [µ] and [µ + 1, ∞]. As the pdf is monotone on the left and right symmetric part of
the mean, the sum of the left and right symmetric parts is approximated by the sum of
multiple rectangle areas with interval width 1. According to the monotonic sequence
theorem, we can derive that the area under the left (∑−1x=−∞ f (x)) and right (∑
∞
x=1 f (x))
symmetric part converge to a finite value respectively, i.e., 1/2, therefore, their sum is up-
per bounded by the integral of a normal density distribution on continuous real-valued
x, which equals to 1. It can be clearly determined from Figure A.1 that each discrete vari-
able x corresponds to a rectangle with the interval width 1, and its pmf value corresponds
to the height of the rectangle. Furthermore, as the pdf value of the mean equals to a finite
value, the total sum of the three parts converges to a finite value. Therefore, the pmf of z
follows:






























Figure A.1: Blue curve: Probability density function (pdf) of a normal distribution with
µ = 0, σ = 5; Vertical dark line: Probability mass function (pmf) of a discrete normal
distribution with µ = 0, σ = 5.
A.2 Bounded Privacy Loss Ensures (ε, δ)-Differential Privacy
Let D be an arbitrary space of record values such as labeled feature vectors, and n be the
natural number of records such that D ∈ Dn represents a database or dataset. Databases
D, D′ ∈ Dn are said to be neighbouring if they differ on exactly one record. A mechanism
M is a random process indexed by Dn, with random outputM(D) termed a response,
governed by probability space1 (R,R, P).
In some cases, it is convenient to work with a probability density representing the
response distribution of M (if it exists!). We’ll denote by pD(x) the PDF (formally the
Radon-Nikodym derivative) of the response distributionM(D), indexed again by D ∈
Dn.
It is common to see researchers define a privacy loss random variable as the absolute
log-odds ratio applied to a random response, and define (ε, δ)-differential privacy by a
high-probability bound on its tail.
Lemma A.1. Consider mechanism response distributionM(D) having probability density pD
for all D ∈ Dn. Define random variable X = M(D) a response drawn from the mechanism
run on D, and a second random variable log pD′ (X)pD(X) the privacy loss at X induced by databases
1Formally: R is the range space ofM—the space of possible responses; R is a σ-algebra defining sets of
responses with measurable probability; and P a probability measure defined on R, the probability distribu-
tion. We’ll avoid this level of formality where possible.
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 ≤ δ ,
ThenM preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Denote by Bε =
{∣∣∣log pD′ (X)pD(X) ∣∣∣ > ε
}
the event on X that the privacy loss is bounded


























M(D) ∈ S ∩ Bε
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= exp(ε) · Pr
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where the second and third equalities follow from pD and pD′ being densities, the first
inequality follows from the privacy loss being bounded above on S ∩ Bε, the second in-
equality follows from S ∩ Bε ⊆ S and S ∩ Bε ⊆ Bε, and the final inequality follows by
assumption that Pr (Bε) ≤ δ.
We closely follow the proof of [22, Theorem A.1] to give the lower bound of the stan-
dard deviation σ of the Gaussian mechanism that achieves (ε, δ)-DP.





it achieves (ε, δ)-DP. Here ∆2 f denotes the L2 sensitivity of the query function f , and Φ is the
Guassian cumulative distribution function (CDF).
Proof. Consider running the mechanismM on a pair of neighbouring databases D, D′ ∈
Dn, such thatM(D) = f (D) + r =M(D′) with r ∼ N(0, σ2 I). Let d = f (D)− f (D′) be
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∣∣∣∣ 12σ2 (‖r‖2 − ‖r + d‖2)
∣∣∣∣
Following [22], for any orthonormal basis b1 . . . bm we can write ri = λibi for λi ∼
N(0, σ2). Without loss of generality, by choosing b1 ‖ d and by the Pythagorean theorem,
[22] obtain the first inequality which is upper bounded by the triangle inequality
∣∣∣∣ 12σ2 (‖r‖2 − ‖r + d‖2)
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To satisfy (ε, δ)-DP, we need Pr
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≤ ε) > 1− δ. Hence we need,
Pr
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where the last inequality follows from Φ−1( δ2 ) < 0 whenever δ < 1. This guarantees
condition (A.2).
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A.3 Weakness of Rastogi et al.’s Protocol
We analyse the weakness of Rastogi et al.’s protocol based on the following two different
attacks:
Attack 1: Collusion attack
Simple Majority Threshold: In the case of a simple majority threshold, the attack re-
quires all dishonest users to collude with a dishonest aggregator. In this scenario, dishon-
est users and aggregator can run the protocol multiple times, each time with a different
honest user. In each run, the partially differentially private value of the honest users will
be revealed. For example, we consider the threshold of 2 among three parties A, B, and
C: A and B are honest, whilst C is dishonest. The aggregator can collude with C to run
the protocol twice, once with A and C and once with B and C. Since C is colluding with
the aggregator, he/she can reveal its values and recover the value of the honest party. No
party, except C, will run the protocol more than once, so their protocol is not able to de-
tect that something is wrong. Due to the more complex steps, and multiple aggregations,
the attack is somewhat all or nothing, in that if a party is to be excluded from a run of
the protocol, they need to be excluded throughout, they can’t just be excluded during the
final aggregation or decryption because some of their r values have been aggregated into
early values.
Strictly less than 1/3 dishonest: When a more conventional threshold is selected, the
attack becomes harder. It requires an honest party to run the protocol more than once
with the same r values. This is a much weaker attack because it is reasonable to assume
that users do not run the protocol multiple times.
Attack 2: Sampling attack
In the case of static data, if an untrusted aggregator exits, then sampling attack works
on their fault tolerance scheme, which is based on the threshold setting where ri values
are picked from a Laplace distribution or any other decent distribution that dropped off
away from zero.
Suppose the same set of honest users can participate over and over again, for example,
the aggregator can sample x1 + r1 arbitrarily many times and get a very good approxima-
tion of x1 (assuming that r1 is distributed with probability mass function around 0, rather
than uniformly from the whole space).
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The following procedure illustrates how to get one sample of x1 + r1:
Step 1: The aggregator implements the first run honestly to learn Σu(xu + ru). It
remembers Enc(x1 + r1) but cannot decrypt it.
Step 2: The aggregator performs the second run with the same set of parties, who
will use the same xu’s but generate new random values, called r′u. Instead of asking
them to decrypt Enc(Σu(xu + r′u)) honestly, the aggregator asks instead for a decryption
of Enc(x1 + r1 + Σu(xu + r′u)). In other words, it remembers individual contribution of
party 1 from the first run. Decryption now gives the aggregator x1 + r1 + Σu(xu + ru),
thus x1 + r1 can be derived by subtracting the output of the second run from the output
of the first run.
Now repeat step 1 and step 2 as many times as we like to get lots of samples of x1 + r.
Other Flaws:
1. Key generation: Each user generates two keys, a and b by selecting elements at ran-
dom from the group. However, there is a constraint that sum of all bi’s equals to 0. Then
Enc(a2) is made public as part of ”key generation”. This part is not explained particularly
well, for example, how to generate individual b to conform to a global constraint. In step
4, Algorithm 5.3: Encrypt-Sum-Squared (yu, ru) Protocol, the aggregator needs Enc(a2) to
derive c′, where a = ∑uau, and au corresponds to the private key pair < au, bu > of each
party, their paper points out Enc(a2) can be computed and made public in a key gener-
ation phase, but not clear who should be responsible for key generation, we assume the
key generation in their model is based on a trusted dealer. Moreover, they mentioned
< au, bu > can be produced through expensive secret sharing protocols. However, se-
cret sharing is not particularly expensive, verifiable secret sharing is, but they reference
Shamir secret sharing, which does not constrain the sum of bi’s to be zero.
2. Communication complexity: Another limitation is that their protocol incurs many
rounds of communication, such as in the step3, Algorithm 5.4: Encrypt-Noisy-Sum (xu, ru),
each user communicates with the aggregator for three times, and step4: Encrypt-Sum,
each user communicates with the aggregator once, too frequent communications increase
the probability of communication failures.
In our model, we make the assumption that honest parties can communicate, and
therefore all honest parties will always take part in the first run. It is the existence of
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the aggregator that makes these attacks possible in their protocol because each user is
unaware of the number of parties it is working with. In our setting, each party is aggre-
gating individually, and therefore they can apply any thresholds themselves. This does
incur an increase in communication cost, however, the most likely solution to the attacks
in their protocol is to run a consensus protocol to ensure everyone is decrypting the same
thing. This is likely to incur additional communication costs.
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